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number of children were orphaned.1 Its popularity soared in the
final decades of the twentieth century, as the number of infants
available for domestic adoption in western countries plummeted.2
In the past decade, however, the number of international adoptions
has declined dramatically, despite a steady increase in both the
number of unparented children3 in poor countries and the number
of people in developed countries wishing to adopt one or more of
those children.4 This discrepancy has occurred primarily because
1 See Alice Hearst, Children, International Human Rights, and the Politics of
Belonging, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?: THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 329, 331 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen
Worthington eds., 2009) (arguing that the practice of transnational adoption began
in the mid-1940s in response to the large number of children “displaced” by the
Second World War); Peter Selman, Global Trends in Intercountry Adoption: 2001–
2010, ADOPTION ADVOCATE (Nat’l Council for Adoption), Feb. 2012, at 4
(“Intercountry adoption began to grow in popularity in the aftermath of the
Second World War.”).
2 See Hearst, supra note 1, at 331 (stating that twenty to thirty percent of all
U.S. adoptions are intercountry adoptions); Shani King, Challenging
Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think About Intercountry
Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 413, 423 (2009) (citing Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist,
International Asian Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 343, 344 (2004)) (suggesting that interest in international adoption grew in
the 1970s in part because “idealism and activist sentiments of the time resulted in
demands that the United States atone for its history of racial and gender
subordination” by adopting a more cosmopolitan attitude and saving children in
the third world from poverty and oppression); cf. Signe Howell, The Backpackers
That Come to Stay: New Challenges to Norwegian Transnational Adoptive Families, in
CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO ADOPTION 227, 229 (Fiona Bowie ed., 2004)
(describing a similar phenomenon in Norway).
3 I use ‘unparented children’ to mean children who should be available for
adoption because both of their parents have died, abandoned them, or
permanently relinquished custody and no kin or community members have taken
over the role of raising them. For the most part, such children are either in state
institutional or foster care or are living on the streets. But not all children living in
orphanages or on streets fall into this category. For example, it is common in
many countries for parents in impoverished regions to place their children in
orphanages temporarily with the hope that one day they will become capable of
resuming care for them. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has used
the similar term “children without parental care.” See Hearst, supra note 1, at 332
(stating that this phrase was the focus of the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child’s September 16, 2005 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland).
4 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Professor of Law & Faculty Dir. of the Child
Advocacy Program, Harvard Law Sch., The International Adoption Cliff: Do
Child Human Rights Matter?, Plenary Speech at the Conference of the Herbert &
Elinor Nootbar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics: Intercountry Adoption:
Orphan Rescue or Child Trafficking? (Feb. 8–9, 2013) (forthcoming), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/pubs.php) (showing a twothirds decline in adoptions into the United States from 2004 to 2013); id. (“Since
2004 the number of orphaned children has only increased, as has the number
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many countries that have been major “sending countries” have
imposed new procedural and substantive restrictions on foreign
adoption or have foreclosed the practice altogether.5
Procedural obstacles to adoption include a requirement that
adoption applicants live in-country with the child for a period of
time, such as six months or a year, which many potential adoptive
parents cannot afford to do.6 A common substantive restriction is a
requirement that children be held available for domestic adoption
for some months or years before the adoption process may begin
with foreign applicants,7 which all but ensures attachment
problems for children.8 Less commonly, some states require that
growing up in the institutions that are so destructive to children’s life
prospects.”).
5 See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Human Rights Position, 1
GLOBAL POL’Y 91, 92 (2010) (citing recently-imposed restrictions in Russia and
China); Meghan Collins Sullivan, For Romania’s Orphans, Adoption is Still a Rarity,
NPR.ORG (Aug. 19, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/19/158924764/
for-romanias-orphans-adoption-is-still-ararity (noting that Romania began
forbidding foreign adoptions a decade ago). As discussed infra, some of these
countries’ actions have come at the urging or insistence of international aid
agencies and NGOs. See Bartholet, supra note 4 (noting that UNICEF has called
for reforms in sending countries). Another contributing factor has been the U.S.
Department of State’s imposition of a no-tolerance policy for adoption
improprieties, refusing to cooperate with sending nations that cannot guarantee
adherence to rules relating to, for example, payments to adoption intermediaries.
Id. (manuscript at 5) (describing the U.S. State Department standard of “not a
single ethical violation” applied to international adoption programs).
6 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Belize, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Jan. 2012), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/
country_specific_info.php?country-select=belize (stating that Belize requires
adoptive parents to live in Belize for 12 months with the child, and that only a
handful of Americans adopt children from Belize each year); U.S. Dep’t. of State,
Gambia, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (July 2012),
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=gambia (noting that Gambia requires adoptive parents to be resident in
the country for a minimum of six months prior to applying for adoption).
7 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Costa Rica, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, (Feb. 2011), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/
country_specific_info.php?country-select=costa_rica (stating that Costa Rican law
prohibits foreign adoption of children under age four); U.S. Dep’t of State, Georgia,
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Aug. 2011),
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=georgia (reporting that children must be held available for domestic
adoption for eight months).
8 Such ‘holding period’ policies are likely to cause many children to have no
parents for the developmentally crucial first two years of life. Demand for
adoption within sending countries is extremely low or non-existent. Ultimately,
these holding period requirements cause many children never to be adopted at
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adopters living abroad be citizens of the child’s country of origin,
which amounts to de facto prohibition.9
Sending countries express a variety of justifications for making
foreign adoption more difficult or impossible, which Part 5 of the
Article will analyze in greater depth.10 Some of the proffered
reasons are unassailable, and the real question is whether they are
weighty enough to justify the restrictions or prohibition. For
example, the possibility that adoption applicants are actually sex or
slave-labor traffickers certainly could justify careful screening
procedures and, if there were evidence of substantial trafficking
via the international adoption process in a particular country, even
a moratorium on out-of-country adoption placements in those
countries until the problem can be adequately addressed.11 Other
reasons for creating obstacles to foreign adoption are morally
questionable, and some are patently illicit. For example, Russian
legislation passed in late 2012 prohibiting Americans from
adopting children in Russia was blatant political retaliation for an
entirely unrelated action by the American government.12 Other
all, because foreign applicants are deterred. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 91 (“[I]t
is extremely rare for children under the age of one to be placed.”); id. at 93 (stating
that there is little prospect for domestic adoption in very poor countries and in the
many Asian countries whose culture includes “a powerful bias for blood-linked
parenting”); James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 415–35 (2008)
(explaining the developmental importance and time frame of infant attachment);
see generally Martin T. Stein et al., International Adoption: A 4-Year-Old Child With
Unusual Behaviors Adopted at 6 Months of Age, 114 PEDIATRICS 1425 (2004)
(presenting a case study in which various doctors opine on whether a child
adopted from a Romanian orphanage has Reactive Attachment Disorder).
9 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Algeria, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Nov. 2011), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/
country_specific_info.php?country-select=algeria (stating that Algeria only
permits Algerian citizens to adopt); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bangladesh, INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Oct. 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/
country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=bangladesh
(explaining that Bangladesh only allows its own citizens to adopt).
10 The justification offered is, of course, not necessarily the actual reason for
the state’s actions. Some countries restrict or foreclose foreign adoption simply
because international aid organizations like UNICEF pressure them to do so. See
infra Section V.
11 But see infra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (explaining why sex and
labor-trafficking are actually not significantly connected to inter-country
adoption).
12 See David M. Herszenhorn & Erik Eckholm, Putin Signs Bill That Bars U.S.
Adoptions, Upending Families, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/12/28/world/europe/putin-to-sign-ban-on-us-adoptions-of-russian-
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frequently-expressed motivations are more directly connected to
adoption but likewise treat unparented children in an instrumental
fashion—such as protecting a nation’s dignity, resisting neocolonialism, or holding on to children as potential future workers.13
Still other justifications sound child-centered, but reasonable
persons disagree about the validity, substantiality, and relative
weight of the concerns. For example, some commentators express
concern about children suffering from not growing up in the
culture of their country of birth, or about parents being induced by
offers of compensatory payment to relinquish their children for
adoption.14
All reasons that nations assert for creating obstacles and all
specific practices that constitute obstacles should be subject to
scrutiny and reasoned deliberation. This should occur within a
morally appropriate normative framework—that is, with a clear
and defensible idea of what rights and interests ought to determine
state policy. Yet there has been little attention given to the
foundational task of establishing such a framework. Debate
children.html (“The bill that includes the adoption ban was drafted in response to
the Magnitsky Act, a law signed by President Obama this month that will bar
Russian citizens accused of violating human rights from traveling to the United
States and from owning real estate or other assets there.”). Russia’s commissioner
of children’s rights has defended restrictions on international adoption on the
grounds that some children adopted by Americans have been abused, killed, or
returned to Russia. See David M. Herszenhorn, Russian Says Ban on U.S. Adoption
Flouts Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/12/26/world/europe/russian-official-says-adoption-ban-violatestreaties.html (quoting Russia’s children’s rights commissioner Pavel Ashtakhov)
(“And we can see that children handed over to the United States are not
protected.”). However, as discussed in Part 5, this line of reasoning is irrational; a
standard of 100% success would condemn any form of care for children, and the
odds of having basic needs met for Russian orphans are far greater with adoption
than with remaining in a Russian institution.
13 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 92 (“In many ‘sending countries’ national
pride has led to calls to stop selling, or giving away, ‘our most precious resources’,
and to claims that the country should ‘take care of our own’.”); David M.
Herszenhorn, In Russia, Ban on U.S. Adoptions Creates Rancor and Confusion, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/world/europe/inrussia-ban-on-us-adoptions-creates-rancor-and-confusion.html (quoting a Russian
politician who accused those opposed to the ban on adoption by Americans of
wanting to “send our intelligence away to America”).
14 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 414 (emphasizing children’s supposed
interest in growing up within the culture of their place of birth); David M. Smolin,
Child Laundering and the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption: The Future and
Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 444 (2010) (collecting
evidence of what Smolin terms “child laundering”).
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concerning state policies on foreign adoption has almost uniformly
taken as given, and thus operated narrowly within, a flimsy
normative framework resting on two poorly-drafted international
conventions relating to children:15 the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC)16 and the Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption (Hague Convention).17
Both conventions contain
provisions relating specifically to inter-country adoption, but the
crucial language is opaque, and thus most of the debate concerning
the provisions focuses on interpretation of that language.18 The
most contentious debate has concerned what these two
conventions dictate with respect to prioritizing placement options
for unparented children as among domestic adoption, domestic
foster care or guardianship, domestic institutional care, and
transnational adoption.19
Because this debate operates almost entirely within the
framework of these special children’s-rights documents, the
reasoning tends to be sui generis. It implicitly supposes that the
situation of unparented children is unlike that of any other persons
and does not require support from any broader principles
15 See Hearst, supra note 1, at 335 (noting the importance of the two
conventions); Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New
International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 733, 737 (2010–11) (“These two
documents—the CRC and the Hague Convention—frame the debate . . . .”). In
fact, the CRC has dominated international debates over child welfare more
broadly for the past quarter century. See SARA DILLON, INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS 3 (2010) (“From the time of its promulgation in 1989, the UNCRC has
provided the focal point for debate as to how contemporary societies should best
protect and empower children.”).
16 See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC].
17 Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167. The United States is a
party to the Hague Convention, along with over eighty other nations. See
generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Convention Countries, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION:
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Aug. 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/hague_
convention/countries.php.
18 See SIGNE HOWELL, THE KINNING OF FOREIGNERS: TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION
IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 170, 172 (2006) (noting that key provisions in both
conventions were left “deliberately vague” in order to get past entrenched
disagreements among groups of nations represented in the negotiations).
19 See Barbara Yngvesson, National Bodies and the Body of the Child:
“Completing” Families through International Adoption, in CROSS-CULTURAL
APPROACHES TO ADOPTION, supra note 2, at 213, 215–17 (describing the debate
surrounding the final language of the Hague Convention).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/4

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

195

concerning state treatment of persons in general. The central thesis
of this Article is that giving primacy to these child-specific
conventions is a mistake, arising from what I call “The Special
Rights Fallacy,” because it facilitates subordination of children’s
welfare to politics, ideology, and the interests of other persons.20 I
call for a reorientation of advocacy, analysis, and deliberation
concerning inter-country adoption, placement priorities for
unparented children, and movement of children more generally
out of inhospitable environments and across national boundaries.
A few other scholars arguing in favor of freer inter-country
adoption have invoked more general human rights conventions
and principles—in particular, treaty provisions affirming a right to
family life. These authors have thereby challenged the hegemony
of the child-specific treaties.21 This Article explains why they are
correct to shift focus away from the CRC and Hague Convention
and why the most powerful legal strategy for inter-country
adoption proponents is to put aside those child-specific
conventions and to appeal instead to general international human
rights laws. The Article further analyzes the relative strength of
various general human rights bases for opposing restrictions on
foreign adoption, concluding that the right to emigrate—which has
been entirely ignored in the debate over inter-country adoption—is
in fact the best vehicle for defending children’s moral right to join
families in other countries.
Part 1 below is conceptual; it explains why and how a limited
focus on group-specific rights provisions, and even passage of such
provisions in the first instance, can inadvertently make a targeted
group worse off. This lesson is applicable not only to children but
also to other groups such as women, racial or cultural minorities,
and disabled persons for whom advocates have sought specialized
rights enactments. I offer some guidance for determining when,

20 Cf. DILLON, supra note 15, at 3–4 (“[I]t is important to recognize the
ubiquitousness of adult agendas in all theorizing about children. . . . Because
children have a symbolic role within the lives of families, cultures and even global
legal systems, they are very likely to be described in self-serving ways by
adults.”); HOWELL, supra note 18, at 14 (“[D]ue to a number of ideological
resistances and complex bureaucracy, only a small minority of theoretically
adoptable children are in fact transferred.”).
21 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (containing examples and
explanation of why a right to family life is not a promising basis for legally forcing
freer inter-country adoption policies and practices).
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and to what extent, special rights are likely to be beneficial for any
group.
Part 2 explains how the CRC and the Hague Convention
exemplify the Special Rights Fallacy. This is because they enshrine
what I will call the “Domestic Placement Preference Principle,”22
which gives signatory nations cover for nearly any restrictions on
inter-country adoption that they care to impose for any reason.
Part 3 identifies more general human rights norms that might
better serve children whose best option, given current realities in
their native country, is international adoption. I also discuss how
these norms might better support advocacy for elimination of
barriers to international adoption.
In particular, the wellestablished basic human rights of all persons to leave their country
of origin and change their nationality—rights that any adult could
invoke against any restriction on emigration for purposes of family
formation (e.g., marriage)—would, for several reasons, be a better
starting point for challenging restrictions on inter-country
adoption than the CRC, the Hague Convention, or any other
general human right. Part 4 explains further why, as a matter of
positive law, the international law documents embodying
universal human rights, including the right to emigrate, have
lexical priority over the conventions enumerating special rights for
children. In short, universal human rights instruments legally
trump the CRC and Hague Convention.
Part 4 examines diverse sources of interpretation of the human
right to leave one’s country of origin and identifies the few reasons
for limiting emigration that are recognized as legitimate. The
examination yields a set of principles that can form a new basis for
assessing barriers to international adoption and for opposing
policies that unjustifiably hold children captive to political aims
and ideology or to the interests of others.
Finally, Part 5 applies these principles to critique commonly
expressed reasons for restricting inter-country adoption, and to
generate provisional conclusions as to which types of restrictions
on such adoption are permissible and under what circumstances.
It concludes that existing restrictive or prohibitive policies fail the
test of legitimacy and therefore violate the general human right to
emigrate that children share equally with adults. None of the
22 Others call this preference the “Subsidiarity Principle,” but use of that term
leads to some confusion and offense, given that “subsidiarity” has a different
meaning in political theory and in Catholic theology.
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justifications that international agencies, NGOs, or national
governments give for restricting the movement of children
internationally for purposes of family formation would be legally
or morally sufficient to justify restrictions on the emigration of
adults. Moreover, no factual differences exist between adults
seeking to emigrate for marriage and children whose best chance
for survival and a nurturing family life lies in inter-country
adoption to warrant a different conclusion.
The Article thus concludes by recommending that thwarted
adoptive parents and bona fide child advocacy organizations file
complaints with the United Nations Human Rights Committee in a
representative capacity on behalf of the children harmed by
barriers to international adoption, alleging a violation of the
children’s human rights to leave their country of birth and to
change their nationality. Even if unsuccessful in triggering
Committee action, such complaints might change the terms and
improve the quality of debate concerning inter-country adoption.
Nothing in this Article is intended to suggest that inter-country
adoption is the answer to poverty, war, and other global problems
that fall especially heavily on less-developed countries. I fully
support other more systemic efforts to improve conditions in
developing countries so that a larger number of parents can
successfully raise their offspring themselves, or, alternatively, that
good adoptive homes can become available within those countries
for cases where parents may be deceased or otherwise
irremediably unable to properly care for their children.
Nevertheless, this Article focuses on the rights of individual
children who are currently living in those less-developed
countries, with the conditions that currently prevail, and who do
not have families or a reasonable prospect of being adopted within
those countries, but who could have the opportunity to become
part of a nurturing family and to live in a safe and healthy
environment through inter-country adoption. These children’s
lives cannot be suspended pending efforts to improve conditions in
their native country; they need nurturing parents now and are
entitled to leave their native countries to obtain them, just as adults
are entitled to leave their native countries to improve their life
prospects.23
23 This Article also does not address immigration policy or the duty of
developed nations to accept immigrants from poor countries generally, or of
children for adoption purposes specifically. As mentioned in note 5, supra, the
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THE SPECIAL RIGHTS FALLACY

We generally suppose that when a law is passed specifying
rights for a particular group of people this must entail an
improvement of their position. If a legislative body goes to the
trouble of declaring that Group A has a right not to be treated in a
certain way, then it must be that Group A has suffered from being
treated in that way and now its members will be better off because
they will no longer be treated in that way. Or if Group A will now
have a positive right to a benefit of a particular kind, its members
must have been denied that benefit in the past and now they will
get it.
However, a supposition that special rights are always and
unqualifiedly advantageous for those upon whom they are
conferred would clearly be false. There is no logically necessary
connection between receiving special rights and being better off
than one was, or would be, without those rights. The connection
could fail to exist in at least four types of cases:
1) When the special rights substitute for, yet are of less
value substantively to the right-holder than, general rights
previously enjoyed or otherwise available;
2) When enforcement of the special rights is relegated to a
separate institution with weaker powers to compel
compliance than are held by the institutions that enforce
general rights;
3) When the thing the special rights guarantee is actually
bad for the right-holders, and either the rights cannot be
waived or the right-holders have no control over assertion
of the right; and
4) When interpretation and enforcement of the special
rights are left to persons or institutions that have interests
or aims contrary to those of the right holder.

U.S. State Department has created obstacles to inter-country adoption of its own.
But those policies ostensibly arise from the same concerns that sending countries
express in support of their policies that are hostile to foreign adoption, and not
from the usual immigration policy concerns. Our government wants to show
sensitivity to sending countries’ concerns. Eliminating or putting in better
perspective the former set of concerns, as I aim to do in Parts IV and V, should
persuade the State Department to remove the obstacles it has created.
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Examples of all four exist in the history of marriage law. With
respect to the first, there are marital rape laws. Historically,
American states have had special laws dealing with marital rape,
and insofar as they prohibit involuntary sex, one might view them
as conferring rights on wives. However, those laws typically have
made rape of one’s wife a less serious offense than rape of a
stranger.24 Thus, the special right of wives, insofar as it supplants
more general criminal prohibitions on rape, actually makes wives
worse off. As to the second, insofar as the legal system has
channeled reports of marital rape or other domestic violence into
civil legal proceedings or into non-legal responses like counseling
to the exclusion of a criminal law response, it has weakened
whatever rights wives might be said to have had. It is difficult to
find examples of the third type—that is, special “rights” that harm
rather than help. But it is conceivable that during the coverture
regime some would have characterized the legal authorization and
societal encouragement of physical chastisement by husbands as a
right that wives enjoyed to their husbands’ assistance in helping
them behave properly.25 As for the fourth type, because wives’
separate identities disappeared as a legal matter under coverture,
such that they could not bring suit on their own behalf,
enforcement of their rights was left to their husbands, who in
many contexts might have had interests or views contrary to those
of their wives.26
The danger that special rights might make their holders worse
off relative to what would otherwise be the case is especially
pronounced when the right holders do not participate in the
process of creating the special rights, as was true with women and
coverture law. Today international negotiation of conventions is
24 See Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as
Allegory, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 556 (2010) (describing state laws
that require a higher standard of proof to establish marital rape or provide for
lower sentences if one is found guilty of marital rape). A contemporary example
is the law of South Carolina. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-615, 16-3-652, 16-3–658
(2012) (differentiating marital rape, which carries a potential sentence of ten years,
from rape in the first degree, which carries a potential sentence of thirty years).
25 See Ellen Marrus & Laura Oren, Feminist Jurisprudence and Child-Centered
Jurisprudence: Historical Origins and Current Developments, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 671,
675-77 (2009) (explaining that under the concept of “marital unity” women
traditionally gave up their rights to property, personal integrity, and child
custody).
26 See id. at 675 (noting that traditionally women lost their separate legal
identity upon marriage).
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highly inclusive of autonomous adults; every affected group can
have input. But when negotiations concern rights for incompetent
persons, such as children, persons other than those having the
special rights bestowed on them are in control, and there is little
guarantee that they will be trustworthy proxies for the right
holders. The danger is multiplied at the stage of implementing
and interpreting rights.
American constitutional doctrine relating to children suggests
some basic guidance as to when advocates for a particular group
should pursue a special rights agenda. Unlike international law,
U.S. federal law has just one fundamental-rights document, the
Constitution, whose rights provisions apply to all persons. Thus,
when minors or their advocates assert rights against certain state
acts or omissions, they invoke the same rights that adults invoke
for themselves. This has the advantage of establishing a starting
point of rights equal to those of adults and imposing on the state
the burden of explaining why children should possess those rights
to a lesser extent than adults do.27 On the other hand, the U.S.
Supreme Court has generally interpreted our Constitution as a
negative-rights instrument, protective primarily of individual
liberty against state interference, and not a positive-rights
instrument creating entitlements to protections and benefits.
Accordingly, it has rejected claims on behalf of children to state
protection against violence within the home and a public school
education of good quality.28 Children in America might benefit,
then, from a constitutional amendment providing them with
special rights related to the state’s child protection system or to
education. But advocates for children should be skeptical of any
proposal to add a constitutional amendment purporting to bestow
special rights on children with respect to, for example, free speech
or search and seizure.
Extrapolating to the international realm, advocates for
vulnerable groups should consider, before pursuing or endorsing a
special-rights convention for the group, whether existing general
27 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (holding that students’ conduct in school was protected by the First
Amendment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (extending several procedural
protections from the adult criminal context to juvenile delinquency cases).
28 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–97
(1989) (rejecting the claim that a child had a constitutional right to state protection
from an abusive parent); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (denying the existence of a fundamental right to education).
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human rights enactments contain provisions that could, if properly
interpreted, give the group all that the advocates seek. If so, they
might focus their efforts instead on developing a jurisprudence of
those general rights provisions that is favorable to the group.
Promoting a special rights convention is likely to be advantageous
only when a group has special needs that universal human rights
cannot protect. And in that situation, advocates should limit the
scope of any group-specific document they promote to provisions
needed to address the special needs.
2.

CRC AND HAGUE CONVENTION EXEMPLIFY THE SPECIAL RIGHTS
FALLACY

All of the ways identified in Part 1 by which the special rights
syllogism can be fallacious are true of the CRC and the Hague
Convention. With the CRC, this goes beyond the adoption context.
That convention on the whole has as much to say explicitly about
rights of parents, and implicitly about rights of cultures and
nations, to possess and control children as it has to say about the
rights of children themselves.29 Moreover, an omnibus provision
implies that interests of other people or of a nation collectively can
properly factor into any and all decisions about children’s lives,
rather than requiring that decisions concerning matters at the core

29 See CRC, supra note 16, at art. 3(2) (requiring State parties to “tak[e] into
account the rights and duties of his or her parents”); id. at art. 5 (“States Parties
shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable,
the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local
custom . . .”); id. at art. 14(1) (“States Parties shall respect the right of the child to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”); id. at art. 14(2) (“States Parties
shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the
child in the exercise of his or her right . . .”); id. at art. 18(1) (“Parents . . . have the
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child.”). In
some instances, what is expressed in terms of children’s rights appears designed
at least as much to protect interests of parents, cultural groups, or nations. See,
e.g., CRC at art. 7(1) (“The child shall . . . have the right . . . as far as possible . . . to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.”); id. at art. 8(1) (“States Parties
undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful
interference.”); id. at art. 9(1) (“States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be
separated from his or her parents against their will . . .”); id. at art. 10(2) (“States
Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to leave any
country. . .”). For a child-centered assessment of the pros and cons of the CRC, see
generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective, 633 ANNALS OF
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80 (2011).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

202

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:1

of children’s lives, such as who will raise them when their parents
cannot, rest solely on their best interests.30
Such detractions from a singularly child-centered document
reflect the fact that the Convention was a product of negotiation
and compromise among adult representatives of nations with
widely divergent agendas and different degrees of willingness to
go down the road of recognizing children as bearers of rights.31
For example, Islamic nations were highly resistant to attributing to
children a right to freedom of religion, and some African countries
opposed any language that could be read to proscribe female
genital alteration.32 And yet, the CRC was arguably unnecessary to
the cause of gaining for children respect as right holders, given the
comprehensive applicability of more general international human
rights conventions and declarations, such as the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (conferring
numerous negative rights on “everyone”) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
(conferring numerous positive rights on “everyone”). Thus, on
balance, the CRC might have been a strategic error on the part of
advocates for children.
In the adoption context, advocates for policies and practices
that facilitate international adoption for the sake of unparented
children have complained about Article 21, which appears to
establish a strong preference for placing unparented children in
any domestic residential situation rather than permitting a foreign
adoption. This Domestic Placement Preference Principle (DPP
Principle) was included in the Convention at least in part out of

30 See CRC supra note 16, at art. 3(1) (“In all actions concerning children, . . .
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). This is quite
different from saying that children’s interests shall be the sole consideration or
even that children’s interests shall be paramount or the primary consideration.
31 See TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 47–49 (2005) (noting the
lengthy process of ratification); DILLON, supra note 15, at 14 (noting lack of
enthusiasm among many countries when Poland proposed the CRC in 1978); id. at
15 (noting that the Working Group that drafted the CRC “operated on the basis of
consensus” rather than majority vote, giving any participating country a de facto
veto); id. at 16 (describing politically-driven obstructionism in the CRC drafting
process); id. at 18–19 (identifying points of especially acute disagreement, as to
which compromises had to be reached).
32 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 169, 171–72 (arguing that the differences in
culture and morals between member nations at the convention made it difficult to
“articulate worldwide moral standards for the treatment of children”).
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consideration for the pride of developing countries,33 and also in
part because of Islamic countries’ opposition to any language that
might suggest an obligation to permit adoption, a practice not
tolerated within Islam.34 Article 21(b) requires state parties to:
Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered
as an alternative means of child’s care, if the child cannot be
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any
suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of
origin.
Against a backdrop of long-standing blanket prohibitions on
foreign adoption in many developing countries, this provision
might be seen as an effort to nudge such countries toward some
acceptance of the practice by getting them to acknowledge that
sometimes allowing a foreign adoption is the only humane thing to
do. Interpreted in that way, it appears that the provision was
intended to increase the practice of inter-country adoption.
However, many read this provision as requiring that inter-country
adoption be the last alternative considered, permissible only when
there is no “suitable” place, institutional or otherwise, to house a
child in the child’s country of origin.35 In other words, they treat
33 See id. at 161 (stating that many countries feel international adoption
reflects poorly on their ability to look after their own abandoned children).
34 See DILLON, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that, in taking into account Islam’s
ban on adoption, Article 21 of the treaty made clear that each nation does not have
to set up a system of adoption).
35 See BUCK, supra note 31, at 154 (noting that the Committee has criticized
Korea for not making international adoption a last resort); id. at 155 (stating that
the travaux preparatoires for the CRC reflect the view that international adoption
should be a last resort); Peter Thurnham, MP, Inter-country adoption: A view from
the House of Commons, in INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES, 138,
142 (Michael Humphrey and Heather Humphrey, eds., 1993) (reiterating that
inter-country adoption is viewed as appropriate only where no other suitable
alternative exists for the child); Carlson, supra note 15, at 736–37 (explaining that
the CRC allows for inter-country adoption only when a child cannot find a
suitable home anywhere else); Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts
on the Human Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 173 (2007) (stating that
the Chair of the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted
“suitable” care in the state of origin to include foster care). See also Guidelines for
the Alternative Care of Children, G.A. Res. 64/142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/142, at
¶ 11 (Feb. 24, 2010) (“All decisions concerning alternative care should take full
account of the desirability, in principle, of maintaining the child as close as
possible to his/her habitual place of residence, in order to facilitate contact and
potential reintegration with his/her family and to minimize disruption of his/her
educational, cultural and social life.”). But see id. ¶ 22 (“[A]lternative care for
young children, especially those under the age of 3 years, should be provided in
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the provision as intended to reduce the practice of inter-country
adoption by committing state parties to making it a last resort.36
Based on that latter interpretation, countries can defend
extraordinarily restrictive policies concerning foreign adoption on
the grounds that they are attempting to comply with the DPP
Principle. In fact, UNICEF, citing the CRC, has pressured
impoverished nations to enact, as a condition for receiving aid,
laws relating to foreign adoption that come close to complete
prohibition.37
The DPP Principle has caused an inestimable number of
children who could have been adopted to remain in orphanages,
many in horrendous conditions, or to live on streets because there
was no better domestic alternative for them.38 This is an instance
family-based settings.”); id. ¶ 23 (prescribing “an overall deinstitutionalization
strategy”); Bartholet, supra note 5, at 98 (stating that some regional and national
courts have concluded that the DPP Principle is subordinate to the CRC’s
paramount purpose to serve children’s best interests.).
36 Cf. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Child’s Story, 24 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 333, 339 (2007) (“All this law [the CRC and Hague Convention] has
tended to function generally to restrict rather than to facilitate international
adoption.”).
37 See Elizabeth Bartholet, “Bartholet Responds to Smolin” in The Debate, in
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 233, 247 (Judith L.
Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi eds., 2012) (indicating that UNICEF benefits
financially from getting impoverished countries to restrict foreign adoption);
Batholet, supra note 36, at 341–42 (stating that UNICEF has used its regulatory
power to discourage inter-country adoption); Bartholet, supra note 5, at 92 (stating
that “UNICEF calls for policy changes designed to limit international adoption to
last-resort status” and noting that the Human Rights Consultative Committee
opposed Madonna’s adoption of a child from Malawi by “arguing that under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child institutional care was preferred to
international adoption”); id. at 93 (noting that UNICEF has called for elimination
of private intermediaries, which in some countries play a crucial role in
international adoption, and that “[s]uch foster care as now exists in poor countries
is often quite terrible, ‘a euphemism for cottage industry-level
institutionalization’”); Letter to Prime Minister Regarding Inter-Country
Adoption from UNICEF Romania Media Center (February 6, 2004) reprinted in
DILLON, supra note 15, at 507 (“[I]nter-country adoption is to be considered as an
exceptional measure and last resort . . . .”).
38 See LAURIE AHERN ET AL., MENTAL DISABILITY RTS. INT’L, HIDDEN SUFFERING:
ROMANIA’S SEGREGATION AND ABUSE OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
(2006), available at www.crin.org/docs/mhri_rom.pdf (describing institutions
housing unparented children in Romania); Bartholet, supra note 5, at 93 (alluding
to reports on orphanages in Vietnam, Guatemala, and Romania after those
countries imposed moratoria on international adoption); Bartholet, supra note 5,
at 95 (citing estimates that 8 million children are living in orphanages around the
world and 100 million are living on the streets); Children in Residential Institutions
Desperately Vulnerable to Abuse, UNICEF PRESS CENTER (May 31, 2005),
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of the fourth problem with special rights for children—that is, that
their interpretation and enforcement is left in the hands of public
officials, governing institutions, and private organizations who
purport to be agents for children, ostensibly promoting their
welfare and enforcing their rights, but who in reality might serve
other people and other aims and end up causing great harm to
children.39
Another version of the DPP Principle has been read into the
Hague Convention. That Convention begins in its preamble by
“[r]ecognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage
of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot
be found in his or her State of origin.” Article 4, which is more of a
directive than is the preamble, states:
An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take
place only if the competent authorities of the State of origin
. . . have determined, after possibilities for placement of the
child within the State of origin have been given due
consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s
best interests.40
The preamble language might be read to prioritize foreign
adoption above domestic foster care or institutional care, if those
do not provide a child with a “family,” and thus to suggest a
weaker DPP Principle than that of CRC Article 21.
But
intercountry adoption opponents and skeptics can plausibly
maintain that at a minimum it requires giving priority to domestic
adoption applicants, if there are or might be any who meet the
minimalist standard of “suitable,” regardless of whether a foreign
placement would be better for a child.
Ordinarily, though, directive articles in a code have more
weight than preamble language, so Article 4 should be controlling
in assessing whether states’ policies conform to the Hague
Convention. Yet Article 4 is vague and ambiguous, particularly in
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_27185.html (discussing Eastern Europe
and Central Asia). I do not mean to suggest that there are sufficient adoption
seekers to provide a family for all children of the world living in orphanages or on
streets.
39 See also Herszenhorn, supra note 13 (stating that Russia’s ombudsman for
children is among the strongest defenders of the government’s decision to
prohibit Americans from adopting Russian children).
40 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of
Intercountry Adoption preamble art. 4, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1139.
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its use of the term “due consideration.” Arguably it requires no
more than that state parties give consideration contemporaneously
in every case to both domestic applicants, if there are any at that
moment, and foreign applicants. It would seem consistent with the
terms of this provision for a state to choose foreign applicants over
domestic applicants based simply on a finding that the intercountry adoption would be, all things considered, better for the
child than a domestic adoption. On the other hand, Article 4 does
not clearly require states to approve the best option for children. It
appears to permit states to favor domestic adoption, and indeed
domestic foster care or institutional care, if they wish to do so and
even if that is not in children’s best interests.41 In fact, the Hague
Conference on Private International Law took that position in
guidance it issued in 2008.42
Thus, Article 4 and other provisions in the Hague Convention43
collectively establish just this set of rules: 1) States may approve
foreign adoptions when it is in a child’s best interests, and 2) States
must not approve foreign adoptions that are not in a child’s best
interests. What the Convention does not dictate is that state parties
must permit international adoption when it is in children’s best
41 See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Hague Convention: Pros, Cons, and Potential 2
(Sept. 5, 2013) (forthcoming), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
bartholet/pubs.php (“The Hague’s negative impact is a result of the fact that
policy makers have ignored its positive aspects, have misinterpreted it as more
restrictive than it was intended to be . . . .”); Smolin, supra note 14, at 447–62
(stating that the Hague Convention was in fact aimed simply at trying to reduce
the buying and stealing of children, not at establishing placement priorities).
42 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 93 (explaining that UNICEF contends the
Hague Convention supports its position that in country adoption and even
permanent foster care is preferable to intercountry adoption). The U.S. State
Department appears to interpret the Convention as requiring states to complete a
search for domestic adopters before considering foreign applicants. See, e.g., U.S.
Dept. of State, Georgia, supra note 7 (“[T]he Convention requires that Georgia
attempt to place a child with a family in-country before determining that a child is
eligible for intercountry adoption.”).
43 Article 1 of the Convention contains the non-committal language: “The
objects of the present Convention are . . . to establish safeguards to ensure that
intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with
respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law . . .”
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation, supra note 40, at art. 1.
That language could be read to say only that international adoption should not
occur if it is not in a child’s best interests or is contrary to the child’s fundamental
rights. It says at least that. It is debatable whether it commands that international
adoptions must take place when that is in a child’s best interests or suggests that
children might have a fundamental right to be available for international
adoption.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/4

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

207

interests. It leaves states free to refuse foreign adoptions even
when children would be far better off by being adopted
internationally. In fact, the Hague Convention does not clearly
commit state parties to allow foreign adoption at all in any
circumstances.44
In any event, UNICEF accords greater weight to the CRC
provision regarding inter-country adoption, and that agency,
because of its control over substantial U.N. aid money, drives
policy in the least developed parts of the world—that is, in
countries where there is likely to be the greatest number of
children needing to be adopted.45 Moreover, whereas all nations of
the world other than the United States and Somalia are parties to
the CRC, most nations are not parties to the Hague Convention.46
In short, although the CRC and the Hague Convention might in
some ways have improved the lives of some children in some parts
of the world,47 they have also arguably harmed many children in
certain ways. Reasonable people can disagree about what those
ways are, but no one can reasonably deny that creating special
rights for children presents this danger—that is, that children
might as a result have less protection than they would have in the
absence of those special rights. This is true simply as a conceptual
matter, as explained above.

44 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and
American Implementing Law: Implications for International Adoptions by Gay and
Lesbian Couples or Partners, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 113, 144 (2008)
(“Ironically, encouraging intercountry adoption is not one of the formal objectives
of the Convention.”).
45 See Bartholet, supra note 41, at 2 (“UNICEF, the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child, and others defer to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) in its preference for in-country foster care over out of country adoption.”);
Bartholet, supra note 5, at 92–93 (stating that UNICEF disfavors intercountry
adoption and supports the development of in-country adoption alternatives). See
also BUCK, supra note 31, at 157 (reading the preamble to the Hague Convention as
signaling that it is subordinate to, and should be interpreted consistent with, the
CRC).
46 See Convention Countries, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(Aug. 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/hague_convention/countries.php (listing
89 countries as parties to the convention); U.S. Bureau of Intelligence & Research,
Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (charting the 195 independent states
in the world).
47 But see DILLON, supra note 15, at 6 (“[T]here seems to be no area of
children’s rights where solid improvement can be cited as a result of the UNCRC.
. . . [A]ll negative indicators seem to be worsening, some dramatically so.”).
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With respect to inter-country adoption, any nation could justify
any restriction on it simply by citing the CRC’s preference for
domestic placements.48 It is not clear, for example, that Russia has
violated the CRC by shutting down adoption by Americans, even
though it means many thousands of children, including many
disabled children, will never have a family life.49 It is not clear that
either the CRC or the Hague Convention provides a basis for
condemning Eritrea for its recently-enacted policy of refusing to
allow foreign adoption unless at least one adoptive parent is of
Eritrean heritage and has completed national service, which is
tantamount to not permitting foreign adoption at all.50 Or for its
former policy of requiring non-citizen adoptive parents to live in
Eritrea with the child for six months, a policy that helps explain
why Americans adopted only four Eritrean children in 2010.51 Yet
Eritrea is one of the most impoverished nations on earth and likely
has tens of thousands of children orphaned by famine, disease, and
violence. Its adoption policies force such children to live and die in
miserable and dangerous circumstances despite the willingness of
people in more developed countries to adopt them.52
48 In theory, a party to the CRC would also need to give the U.N. Children’s
Rights Committee some explanation as to why a particular restriction is consistent
with treatment of children’s welfare as “a primary consideration” in its decision
making. See CRC, supra note 16, at art. 3 (committing signatory nations to making
children’s best interests “a primary consideration” in matters affecting them). But
that Committee is quite supportive of the DPP and so likely to be an easy
audience for such an explanation. See sources cited supra note 35 (discussing
various interpretations of DPP article 21(b)).
49 See Herszenhorn, supra note 13 (“Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets
noted that Russia currently has a database of 128,000 orphans eligible for adoption
but only about 18,000 prospective families willing to adopt . . . Alla V. Prozorova,
an adoption facilitator . . . who has worked in the field of international adoptions
for 14 years, said . . . ‘People who are involved in this problem—I mean even
higher-level authorities—they know only Americans really volunteer to adopt
special needs children . . . No Italian, no French, no Germans.’”). Russia is not a
party to the Hague Convention.
50 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Eritrea, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (July 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/
country_specific_info.php?country-select=eritrea (stating the requirements to
adopt a child from Eritrea into the United States).
51 See id.
52 See Xan Rice, Eritrea ‘Like a Giant Prison’, Claims Human Rights Group, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2009, 5:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/
apr/16/eritrea-africa-human-rights-refugees (stating that young people who are
trying to flee the country are shot at the border and even if they are successful in
escaping their parents will be made to suffer); 20 Poorest Countries in the World,
THE
RICHEST
(May
27,
2012,
6:50
AM),

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/4

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]
3.

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

209

GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERTINENT TO INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION

Supporters of international adoption should therefore step back
and away from these special children’s rights instruments and
think about how more general human rights instruments apply to
the plight of children who are living on streets or in orphanages in
countries where there is little or no prospect for them to have a
decent life in a permanent family. What seems to have escaped the
notice of most scholars, diplomats, and advocates is that
international and regional conventions conferring human rights on
all persons can support arguments for state policies and practices
more favorable to inter-country adoption. Nearly everyone’s
instinct is to look at the special conventions relating to children and
to look no further.53 Yet if a similar predicament arose for any
adults, we would look to general human rights instruments with
confidence that we would find in them an adequate basis for
ascribing to those adults a right comparable to what adoption
proponents seek for children.
What would be a similar predicament? At issue for children in
connection with international adoption is their ability to leave their
country of origin to form a family relationship with individuals in
another country who want to form that relationship and whose
country is willing to let them immigrate for that purpose. This
right is the same thing desired by any adults in Russia or
Guatemala or China who want to leave their country of origin and
go to the U.S. or the U.K. or Germany in order to marry citizens of
those countries.
Those other countries are open to their
immigration for the purpose of forming a family relationship with
a citizen, just as they have been open to immigration of adopted
children.54 And if any of those sending countries blocked the
departure of such adults seeking to enter into family relationships
in any of those receiving countries, these adults could file

http://www.therichest.org/world/poorest-countries-in-the-world/
(including
Eritrea as one of the twenty poorest countries in the world and explaining that its
economic conditions have not improved in recent years).
53 Cf. BUCK, supra note 31, at 47 (observing that the CRC “has established
itself as the central international instrument on children’s rights”).
54 See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1625, 1650–52 (2007) (stating that the annual number of fiancé visas
approved by the Department of Homeland Security has been increasing and that
the United States frequently allows immigration for the purposes of marriage).
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complaints with the U.N.’s Human Rights Committee and with
regional human rights adjudicative bodies. Absent compelling
justification of a particular sort, the sending countries would be
found in violation of treaty obligations and human rights. Which
human rights?
3.1. The Right to Leave and Change Nationality
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which
begins with “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family . . . ,”55
unqualifiedly states: “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country,
including his own . . . .”56 Virtually identical language appears in
the more binding ICCPR and in several regional treaties.57 One
hundred sixty-seven of the world’s one hundred ninety-five
independent states are parties to the ICCPR, including nations that
have severely limited or entirely prohibited foreign adoptions such
as Guatemala, Eritrea, and Russia. The list of member countries
also includes major adoption receiving countries such as the
United States.58 The UDHR further proclaims: “[n]o one shall be
55 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, preamble,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (emphasis added).
See also id. at art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.”); id. at art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind . . . .”).
56 Id. at art. 13, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Though on the surface merely a
resolution without force of law, the UDHR is generally regarded as having
acquired the status of customary international law, and the United Nations’
General Assembly has stated that some of its provisions “constitute basic
principles of international law.” Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman,
Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 143
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
57 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12 ¶ 2, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.”) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights art. 22 ¶2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (“Every person has the right to leave any country freely, including
his own.”); Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2 ¶ 2, Sept. 16, 1963, 7 I.L.M. 978, 979 (“Everyone
shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”). The CRC actually
contains similar language, but attributes the right to children and parents in such
a way as to suggest a jointly-exercised right was intended. See CRC, supra note 16,
at art. 10 (“Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to
leave any country, including their own . . . .”).
58 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Signatories), UNITED
NATIONS TREATY SERIES DATABASE,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTS
Online.aspx?id=1 (select “Title Search” tab; then search “Match this phrase”
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. . . denied the right to change his nationality.”59 Regional treaties
contain similar pronouncements.60 These are more explicit and
direct pronouncements of a right that lies at the core of what
advocates for unparented children seek—namely, a right against
the government of the children’s country of origin preventing them
from leaving even when that is best for them. As reflected in the
international tribunal proceedings discussed in Part 4 below, states
infringe this right not only when they impose an outright
prohibition on emigration but also when they create unwarranted
practical obstacles to emigration.61
This right of emigration is an especially strong one among
human rights today, as evidenced by the relative rarity of its
infringement with respect to adults in recent decades, despite the
interest states might have in preventing the exit of their most
talented citizens or their most vocal critics; the widespread
condemnation of nations that have denied their citizens freedom to
leave;62 and the fact that some countries assert the right of
criteria selection for “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”; then
follow “See Details” hyperlink for Registration Number I-14668) (listing state
parties).
59 UDHR, supra note 55, at art. 15, ¶ 2.
60 See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XIX,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (Apr. 30, 1948),
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92, doc. 31 rev. 3 at 17 (1996) (“Every person has the
right to the nationality to which he is entitled by law and to change it, if he so
wishes, for the nationality of any other country that is willing to grant it to him.”);
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 12 ¶ 2, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217 (“Every individual shall have the right to leave any country
including his own . . . .”).
61 See, e.g., Alice Huling, Domestic Workers in Malaysia: Hidden Victims of Abuse
and Forced Labor, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 629, 659 (2012) (“Everyone should
have the right to leave any country . . . . These rights are effectively denied when
employers keep their workers’ passports and the immigration laws are such that
individuals cannot exit their workplace without their papers.”).
62 See Kieran Oberman, Can Brain Drain Justify Immigration Restrictions?, 123
ETHICS 427, 431 (2013) (citing the former Soviet Union and East Germany as states
condemned for violating the right to emigrate); Eric Retter, Comment, You Can
Check Out Any Time You Like, But We Might Not Let You Leave: Cuba’s Travel Policy
in the Wake of Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 651, 659 (2009) (“Throughout much of its Marxist regime,
Cuba has been harshly criticized from the outside for its . . . travel laws . . . .”);
Cox News Service, Soviets Sought Pledge Athletes Couldn’t Defect, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
May 17, 1984, at 1 (indicating that the Soviets’ request that the Reagan
Administration return to Soviet custody any Soviet athletes who sought to defect
during the Los Angles Summer Olympic Games was “promptly rejected as
morally and politically objectionable”); Yevgenia Pismennaya & Yekaterina

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

212

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:1

emigration as an excuse for not acting more aggressively to
prevent human trafficking.63 Indeed, political theorists view
respect for the right of exit as a pre-condition for the very
legitimacy and sovereignty of a nation.64 Invoking it as a basis for
opposing any country’s restrictions or prohibitions on adoption by
foreigners therefore imposes a much more demanding burden of
justification on such a country than does the CRC or the Hague
Convention, as explained further below.
A related human right is one against arbitrary detention.65 This
right is arguably an even stronger human right, generally treated
as a “peremptory norm” from which derogation is impermissible.66
One could plausibly argue that foreclosing foreign adoption
amounts to detention, at least for children with readily identifiable
potential foreign adoptive parents and no prospect for joining a
family domestically; the country’s policy in effect causes them to
remain in state custody rather than going to a home that awaits
them. It seems unlikely, though, that any international body
would view a state’s inhibiting foreign adoption as detention. The
prototypical form of detention is holding in a prison-like facility
persons who otherwise could be and would be living freely in the
community. Some legal authorities might regard that right as
always inapt in the case of infants, given that young children must
always be in someone’s custody, and especially inapt in the case of

Kravchenko, Jackson-Vanik Amendment Could Be Lifted, THE MOSCOW TIMES, April
26,
2010,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/article/jackson-vanikamendment-could-be-lifted/404772.html (discussing 1974 federal U.S. law that
“limited trade with countries of the socialist bloc that stopped their citizens from
emigrating by denying most favored nation status”). See also Megan J. Ballard,
Post-Conflict Property Restitution: Flawed Legal and Theoretical Foundations, 28
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 462, 480 (2010) (“Between the end of World War II and the
conclusion of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Western governments that supported
the United Nations emphasized the right to leave much more than the right to
return.”).
63 See, e.g., Roza Pati, States’ Positive Obligations with Respect to Human
Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v.
Cyprus and Russia, 29 B.U. INT’L L. J. 79, 91 (2011) (noting this argument by
Russia).
64 See Carter Dillard, The Primary Right, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 860, 865 (2012)
(“[O]ne ought to be able to choose to consent or not consent to any and all
political systems”).
65 UDHR, supra note 55, at art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”).
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 cmts. d-i (1987); id. at § 102 cmt. k.
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infants who lack private caregivers and who are therefore
inevitably in state custody. Moreover, preventing emigration for
adoption purposes, while legally authorizing placement of a child
in any suitable and available home within the country, is
conceptually much less restrictive than is de jure confinement of
someone to an institution, even if as a practical matter refusing
emigration means the person must remain in a state institution,
because no other domestic residential placement is available.
Analogously, if an adult were living in some country’s state-run
homeless shelter, because she had no family in that country and no
income, and had an opportunity to marry and live with someone
in another country but was denied the freedom to emigrate, we
would not characterize her situation as one of detention. We
would simply say that her right to leave the country is being
infringed. Violation of the right to emigrate seems the best way
also to conceptualize the wrong done to children whose only or
best opportunity for family life is in another country and who
suffer loss of that opportunity because of their native country’s
policies relating to foreign adoption per se.
The ICCPR does qualify the right to leave any country,
authorizing restrictions on that right that “are necessary to protect
national security, public order . . . , public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”67 Such qualifications
leave much room for interpretation—Part 4 below canvasses the
interpretations that different tribunals and scholars have given to
them.
Nevertheless, they confine the range of possible
justifications, whereas the CRC’s DPP Principle appears to allow
for any justification, or no justification, to suffice for denying
children the opportunity to emigrate in order to have a family.
Further, the ICCPR’s requirement that any restrictions be
consistent with other rights embodied in it should mean that any
restriction imposed on the exit of children presumptively must
apply also to adults, because Article 2 of the ICCPR establishes a
67 ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 12 ¶ 3. The UDHR lists, as an additional
potential justification for infringing the rights it pronounces, “meeting the just
requirements of . . . the general welfare in a democratic society.” UDHR, supra
note 55, at art. 29 ¶ 2. The drafters of the ICCPR, however, rejected that basis for
denying the right to emigrate. Jeffrey Barist et al., Who May Leave: A Review of
Soviet Practice Restricting Emigration on Grounds of Knowledge of “State Secrets” in
Comparison with Standards of International Law and the Policies of Other States, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 381, 388 (1987).
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right to equal treatment for all persons. This requirement
reinforces a further advantage that invoking general human rights
documents will generally provide for those advocating on behalf of
children—namely, that interpretation in any particular case of the
content of the right and permissible infringements should be
constrained by precedents and other official guidance covering a
broad range of cases and involving a variety of right holders in a
variety of situations. Interpretation is thus less likely to be sui
generis than if a group-specific right were at issue.
3.2. Other General Human Rights
In addition to the direct protections of freedom to emigrate,
numerous international instruments pronounce other types of
rights for all humans that could form a less direct or more
contingent basis for objecting to restrictive international adoption
policies. For example, Elizabeth Bartholet has argued against such
policies on the basis of a human right to family life,68 some version
of which appears in the ICCPR, the UDHR, and a few regional
treaties.69
A ‘right to family’ on the surface might seem more apt in the
context of adoption. But it supports international adoption only
contingently, indirectly, and weakly. It is actually a quite
68 Bartholet led an appeal to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, on the basis of provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights,
for assistance in getting Latin American nations to reopen international adoption.
The appeal rested in part on language in that Convention relating specifically to
children, conferring on them a right to “special protection, care and aid,” but it
also cited the universally applicable “right of every person to a family.” Hearing
on Human Rights of Unparented Children and Related International Adoption Policies,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H. R., 137th Ordinary Period of Sessions, (2009) (written
testimony of Delegation), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
about/cap/ia/testimonyfullnov09.pdf. See also Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in
the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to be Adopted, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
701, 704–05 (2010-11) (urging the right to family life as a normative basis for
opposing restrictions on inter-country adoption). A ‘right of children to special
care’ is a special right, and so invites sui generis interpretations. It is also phrased
as a positive right, and so lacks the normative force negative rights carry.
Additionally, it is quite vague, allowing a country to avoid a charge of violating
the right by asserting any minimally plausible account of how that country is
extending special care to children. The same is true of invocation of CRC’s Article
3 provision committing signatory nations to making children’s best interests “a
primary consideration” in matters affecting them. CRC, supra note 16, at art. 3. In
addition to being vague, the phrasing of Article 3 actually suggests countries
should balance other primary considerations against children’s welfare. Id.
69 See sources cited infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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amorphous concept. One thing it might mean is an entitlement to
form or join a family rather than remain alone or in an institution.
But it is difficult to find a textual basis for children’s having that
right; human rights documents typically confer the right to form a
family expressly just on adults.70 Moreover, as applied to
unparented children, it would seem to be a minimalist conception,
just guaranteeing some family to belong to. A country might
plausibly defend prohibition of foreign adoption by claiming that
it is seeking families domestically, thereby putting critics in the
position of having to show that no families are available
domestically for many or most unparented children or that the
country’s search efforts are irremediably inadequate. As such, the
right does not support a direct facial attack on a strong in-country
placement preference.
Moreover, the more common articulation and interpretation of
a human right relating to family life makes it a protection of
existing family relationships.71 Not only does that not support
advocacy for more adoptions but in fact a government could
invoke entitlement to such protection as a justification for fewer
foreign adoptions. “Family” can include distant relatives, even
unknown blood relatives if interpreted in a biological sense. As
such, a country could invoke the right to protection of family life in
support of a policy to scour the countryside indefinitely looking for
any kin who might be willing to take custody of an
70 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 23 ¶ 2 (“The right of men and women
of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.”);
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Men and women of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family . . . .”); American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 60, at art. VI (applying to
Latin American sending countries and announcing without any age qualification
that “[e]very person has the right to establish a family . . .”); UDHR, supra note 55,
at art. 16 ¶1 (“Men and women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to
found a family.”).
71 See, e.g., ICCPR supra note 57, at art. 17 ¶ 1 (“No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence . . . .”); id. at art. 23 ¶ 1 (“The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State.”); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 70, at art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”); African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 60, at art. 18 (“The family shall
be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State . . . .”);
UDHR, supra note 55, at art. 12, 16(3) (”No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . .”).
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institutionalized child, rather than permitting foreign non-kin to
adopt a child.72
In addition to family-related human rights, international
conventions establish rights relating to personal development and
opportunity that could be relevant to the plight of unparented
children in impoverished, war-torn, or otherwise inhospitable
nations. The UDHR pronounces rights to “security of person”
(Article 3), “the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality”
(Article 22), and “education” (Article 26(1)). The ICESCR declares
“the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living” (Article
11(1)), “the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger”
(Article 11(2)), “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (Article
12(1)), “the right of everyone to education” (Article 13(1)), and “the
right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress”
(Article 15(1)(b)).
The CRC contains similar provisions
pronouncing a right of children to have their basic needs met,73 but
those provisions compete with the CRC’s more specific DPP
Principle in the context of adoption policy. Therefore, invoking the
super-ordinate and more readily enforceable ICESCR rights should
add greater weight to a basic-needs argument for international
adoption.
These rights to basic goods, however, are positive rights—
vaguely phrased and qualified by language providing that a state
should undertake to provide the enumerated benefits and
opportunities “to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
72 See, e.g., David Smolin, “Smolin’s Position” in The Debate, supra note 37, at
239 (endorsing a strong DPP in part on the grounds that “as a matter of
widespread cultural practice, human need, and fundamental rights, the family
into which the child is born extends beyond the parents, and beyond the nuclear
family, to include an inter-generational and extensive family group”).
73 See, e.g., CRC, supra note 16, at art. 6(2) (“States Parties shall ensure to the
maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.”); id. at art.
23(1) (“States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should
enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote selfreliance and facilitate the child’s active participation in the community.”); id. at
art. 24(1) (“States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness
and rehabilitation of health.”); id. at art. 27(1) (“States Parties recognize the right
of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental,
spiritual, moral and social development.”); id. at art. 28(1) (“States Parties
recognize the right of the child to education . . . .”).
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recognized in the present Covenant.”74 Moreover, the drafters and
signatories of these pronouncements likely presupposed that such
rights would be effectuated, if at all, by ensuring that everywhere
in the world these goods exist for everyone, not by facilitating
international migration. They might have supposed this simply
because the only way its drafter could envision for any person to
actually have these things would be for conditions to improve
where that person currently lives.
Of course, the dream of hospitable social and economic
conditions everywhere in the world will not come true in our
lifetimes and, in the meantime, there is an alternative way to
effectuate such rights for many people—namely, emigrating to a
better place. Thus, an adult seeking to emigrate for marriage
purposes, but whose native country inhibits her exit, might
plausibly assert these economic and opportunity rights, as well as a
right of emigration, if family-related emigration would
dramatically transform her economic situation and opportunities
for a fulfilling life. Those rights provisions could be interpreted as
not merely assertions of positive right—that is, a right to
assistance—but also as assertions of negative right—that is, a right
against state obstruction of any person’s opportunities for a better
life through migration.75 And because these human rights, like the
more direct rights to leave one’s country and change one’s
nationality, belong to “everyone,” not just adults, advocates for
children who are living in inhospitable places could also invoke
these provisions as bases for demanding that the governing
authority in those places remove unwarranted restrictions on
emigration for purposes of family formation.
Still, because the rights to exit and change nationality provide a
more direct and clearly negative-rights basis than other general
human rights for opposing restrictions on inter-country adoption,
the remainder of the Article focuses primarily on them. Invoking
some other rights could lend useful support to that core argument.
74 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See also Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for
Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2004) (explaining the weakness of positive
rights, relative to negative rights, in international and American jurisprudence).
75 The right to migration within the European Union rests largely on this
connection to social and economic opportunity. See Natalie Shimmel, Welcome to
Europe, but Please Stay Out: Freedom of Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the
European Union, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 760, 764–69 (2006) (describing how the
freedom of movement for workers furthers political and economic integration).
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This support is less clear regarding the right to family life, because
it might be, as explained above, a double-edged sword. But
advocacy for freer inter-country adoption could gain much moral
weight by reminding sending nations and international
enforcement agencies of every person’s human right to basic
necessities for physical and cognitive development, a right that
goes tragically yet avoidably unfulfilled for unparented children in
many countries, and by arguing that refusing to allow children in
state-operated institutions to leave the country effectively amounts
to arbitrary detention.
3.3. Advantages of Invoking General Human Rights
Appeal to universal human rights presents numerous
advantages over reliance on special-rights conventions, including
those mentioned above. First, the general-rights documents clearly
announce a strong right against restrictions on emigration,
whereas neither the CRC nor the Hague Convention clearly confers
on unparented children any right against state-imposed obstacles
to their leaving their country of origin to join a family and live in
more hospitable circumstances.76 Relatedly, the UDHR and ICCPR
clearly create a presumption against restrictions on emigration and
impose on the country of origin the burden of proving that any
particular restriction is necessary to serve an enumerated
legitimate aim. They implicitly declare to each state: “You do not
own the people who live on your territory, and you need
exceedingly compelling reason to stop them from leaving.” By
contrast, the CRC and Hague Convention implicitly suppose that
states have an entitlement to retain children, and they do not
appear to demand any justification whatsoever, on the part of state
parties, for restrictions on children’s emigration for adoption.
They suggest a conception of the state as arrogant owner of
unparented children, for whom it is supererogatory to listen to
pleas made on behalf of these children that the state relinquish its
hold on them so they can have a family—a conception well
exemplified by Russia’s behavior in 2012.
Further, as noted above, invoking universal human rights
creates a check against illicit sui generis reasoning about children,
because interpretation of these rights occurs in a variety of settings
76 As noted above, the CRC does mention the right to leave a country, but
appears to confer it on parents, or on children only when exiting with a parent,
rather than on children individually.
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involving people of many sorts—including autonomous adults—
and adjudicative bodies typically aim for consistent interpretation
of rights provisions across contexts. Related to this point about
generalizing interpretations and justifications, appeal to general
human rights instruments can also put important empirical issues
in a different light. For example, the DPP Principle cites an
ostensibly child-centered justification: the supposed interest of
children in growing up within the culture of their state or local
community of origin. Invoking the right of everyone to leave his
or her country of origin places this concern in a broader context
and invites the question whether it is a sufficient reason to stop
anyone and everyone from emigrating, as a matter of state
restriction or individual self-determination.
It would be
implausible to say it is so with respect to any adult who wishes to
leave his or her country in order to marry someone in the United
States or Western Europe.
International tribunals would
undoubtedly reject as a justification for detaining such a person the
paternalistic concern that the adult would suffer by separation
from his or her culture. They would do so not only because of an
aversion to paternalistic restrictions on autonomous adults (much
of the world is not averse to such paternalism), but also because
the concern is quite speculative and relatively insignificant when
compared with the benefits many stand to gain by emigrating. Yet
such a concern about deprivation of culture is arguably less
significant in relation to infants and toddlers, who have little or no
experience or awareness of the culture of their place of origin.
Another important advantage of invoking general human
rights of the sort that the UDHR and the ICCPR contain is that
there is more robust enforcement of those rights than there is of
any rights or guidance that the children’s conventions contain.77
International law enforcement is, as a general matter, weaker than
domestic law enforcement,78 and I am by no means suggesting that
filing complaints with the HRC under the ICCPR would quickly
eliminate obstacles to international adoption. But, the CRC is
77 Cf. DILLON, supra note 15, at 4 (“Nowhere is the gap between international
‘norm production’ and effective remedies more striking than in the case of
children’s rights.”).
78 See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International
Institutions, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5. But see Andrew T. Guzman,
International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008)
(arguing that there are many ways in which international tribunals are effective
even if not in the way we ordinarily expect of domestic courts).
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especially weak among international rights instruments.79 Its only
compliance mechanism consists of state parties’ reporting, every
five years, to a supervising body—the Committee on the Rights of
the Child—that has no authority to order any change in any
country’s practices, even if it were disposed to do so.80 The
Committee can only “make suggestions” for improvement.81 The
CRC reporting system is the equivalent of counseling for marital
rape: every once in a while you check in with a supposed expert to
let them know how you are doing, and to receive advice on how to
do better. There is an appearance of addressing problems, but little
reason to expect a change in behavior. And the only recourse for
Hague Convention violations is for other parties to the Convention
to refuse to do business,82 which is no recourse at all when the
alleged violation is unwarranted restrictions on international
adoption.
By contrast, the ICCPR and its Rules of Procedure not only
mandate that countries report their compliance, but also authorize
state parties to file complaints against other state parties for human
rights violations and, pursuant to a widely-adopted Optional
Protocol, authorize individuals or their proxies to file complaints
against states with the HRC for human rights violations—
including violations of the right to emigrate.83 The HRC issues
79 See John J. Garman, International Law and Children’s Human Rights:
International, Constitutional, and Political Conflicts Blocking Passage of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 659, 681 (2006) (“[T]he CRC is
essentially a toothless agreement with no formal enforcement mechanisms on
participating states.”).
80 See BUCK, supra note 31, at 49–51 (describing legal framework for the
reporting process); DILLON, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing implementation
mechanisms for UNCRC). At most, the Committee can ask. In fact, the
Committee has in recent years discouraged countries from facilitating intercountry adoptions. See Elizabeth Bartholet, “Bartholet’s Position” in The Debate,
supra note 37, at 234–35.
81 CRC supra note 16, at art. 45(d). The Committee can ask for a study of any
particular areas of concern by the U.N. Secretary-General, CRC Art. 45(c), but the
Secretary-General would have no authority to take any coercive action based on
perceived CRC violations.
82 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Guatemala, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF
CONSULAR
AFFAIRS
(March
2013),
http://adoption.state.gov/country_
information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=guatemala (stating that
Guatemala’s adoption system is not in compliance with the Hague Convention
and, as such, no new adoptions are permitted from that country).
83 See Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/3/Rev.6, R. 66, 72, 78, 90 (Apr. 24, 2001) [hereinafter ROP] (authorizing
complaints to be submitted by a representative of the victim of a human rights
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condemnatory decisions and orders against countries it finds to
have violated rights.84 The greatest procedural obstacle to bringing
a complaint before the HRC would appear to be the ICCPR
requirement of exhausting domestic remedies,85 but a child
advocacy organization with sufficient resources might have the
will and wherewithal for a preliminary navigation of the sending
country’s administrative and judicial systems.86
Finally, invoking the rights of children to leave any country
and to change their nationality could trigger a profound attitudinal
shift in the global community in a direction favorable to children.
Such a claim would be jarring to the international adoption
community, the international children’s rights community, and
individual nations. It might disturb entrenched views among
politically-driven bodies who now claim a monopoly on the
authoritative interpretation of children’s rights, such as UNICEF,
and the U.N. Children’s Rights Committee. Demoting the specialrights conventions in the policy framework of nations and
international organizations should also serve children by
violation “when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the
communication personally,” which would certainly be true of babies, infants, and
young children); ICCPR supra note 57, at art. 40–41 (requiring countries to submit
reports on the progress of the expansion of civil and political rights); Status of
Participant Countries to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (listing 114 state
parties to the Optional Protocol, including many actual and potential large
sending countries). The United States is not a party to the Optional Protocol, but
that is irrelevant to the susceptibility of a sending country to complaint before the
HRC, even if initiated by U.S. citizens, so long as the complaint is filed in a
representative capacity on behalf of children who are citizens of the country being
charged and that country is a party to the Optional Protocol.
84 See discussion of cases infra, Part IV.
85 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 2, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (“Individuals who claim that any of
their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have
exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a written communication
to the Committee for consideration.”).
86 Some parents who were on the brink of taking children home from
Russia—children with whom they already established a relationship when that
country imposed a ban on American adoptions—filed complaints with the
European Court of Human Rights. See Sergei L. Loiko & Kim Murphy, Russian
Adoption Ban Leaves U.S. Families in an Agonizing Limbo, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2013),
available at www.latimes.com/la-fg-russian-adoptions-20130521-dto,0,395498.html
(revealing how some families have tried filing complaints with the Court). Cf.
Herszenhorn & Eckholm, supra note 12 (“[T]he relationship between parents and
children begins long before the children leave the orphanage.”).
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reminding everyone that children are not an inferior species
begging for charity, nor any nation’s possessions, but rather equal
persons with the same moral claims that adults have to be free to
pursue
available
opportunities
for
their
betterment,
uncompromised by others’ self-serving agendas. Tapping into
universal human rights in this context should also inspire those
working on other child welfare issues at the international level to
consider always what additional and potentially more effective
legal avenues might be open to them in general human rights
documents.
There could be a wholesale reorientation of
international children’s rights practice and scholarship. The lesson
could also extend to advocacy for other vulnerable populations
that might be disserved by group-specific conventions.
In sum, there are numerous reasons why proponents of
international adoption should break free from the special-rights
framework that now dominates discourse and diplomacy, and
should begin invoking more general human rights laws: 1) those
laws contain a more explicit and direct normative basis for such
advocacy—in particular, the right to leave any country and the
right to change one’s nationality; 2) they clearly impose the burden
of proof on sending nations to justify any restrictions on
international adoption, rather than forcing proponents of
international adoption to persuade such nations that lifting
restrictions is the more humane thing to do; 3) they confine the
range of permissible justifications to a few enumerated ones; 4)
invoking more general human rights incorporates precedents and
scholarly work interpreting those rights in a variety of contexts
involving persons in various categories, thus avoiding the sui
generis reasoning about children and international adoption that
often results in compromising children’s wellbeing; 5) thinking
about the right to migration for the purpose of forming family
relationships at a higher level of generality puts common empirical
assertions about children’s needs and about the quality of life in
particular countries in a different and more objective light; 6)
whereas the enforcement mechanism for the CRC and the Hague
Convention are quite weak, and in particular do not allow for
individual complaints in international tribunals, the more general
human rights laws do offer the opportunity for private
enforcement action in relatively effective institutions; and 7)
asserting universal human rights on behalf of children should
trigger a healthy attitude correction in the international
community.
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3.4. Choice of Law
The existence of both general-rights conventions and
potentially conflicting special-rights conventions raises the
question of which set is controlling. Is it even possible, as a matter
of international law, to invoke general human rights law on a topic
that is the subject of one or more specialized conventions? Does
the specific trump the general, as one canon of statutory
interpretation in American law provides for cases of conflicting
In addition, because the CRC and the Hague
statutes?87
Convention both came later in time than the more general
conventions mentioned above, we must ask whether the later in
time trumps or displaces the earlier.88
The straightforward answer to these questions is that the CRC
and the Hague Convention themselves disavow any displacement
of general, fundamental human rights. The CRC, in Article 41,
states:
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of
the rights of the child and which may be contained in . . .
(b) International law in force for that State.
Article 1 of the Hague Convention sets forth as the first of the
“objects of the present Convention” that party States will “ensure
that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the
child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as
recognized in international law.” Moreover, in both of these
conventions, the language relied on by proponents of the DPP
Principle actually does not speak of rights. The language in Article
21 of the CRC merely qualifies a command to party States that they
consider international adoption. The language in the preamble to
the Hague Convention qualifies a merely empirical statement
about the possible child-welfare benefits of international adoption,
and the language in Article 4 about placement within the State of
origin merely requires “due consideration.”
Any rational decision maker would therefore be hard-pressed
to conclude that either the CRC or the Hague Convention

87 See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E. 2d 185, 192 (Va. 2010)
(articulating the proposition that when two statutes dealing with the same subject
matter are in conflict, the more specific prevails).
88 Cf. State v. Harvey, 187 S.E. 2d 706, 717 (N.C. 1972).
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supplants children’s fundamental rights to emigrate and change
nationality or constricts those rights in any way. Parties to those
conventions agreed to respect all of children’s rights as previously
set forth in international law in their decision making about
intercountry adoption, and they did not purport to be
withdrawing, diminishing, or reinterpreting children’s basic
human right to leave their country of birth.
In addition, the declarations and conventions containing the
general rights pronouncements speak to whether and to what
extent parties may derogate from their strictures.89 As noted
above, the ICCPR authorizes derogation from the right of
emigration in limited circumstances, and it further states:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in
the present Covenant.90
Assuming that “any act” would include entry into a
subsequent convention, becoming a party to the ICCPR entailed a
commitment to refrain from signing on to any other convention, or
from interpreting any other convention to which one is a party, in
such a way that would authorize denial of the right to emigrate in
any circumstances in which the ICCPR would not permit such
denial. This is consistent with the “Siracusa Principles,” a U.N.
human rights sub-commission’s interpretation of the ICCPR’s
derogation provision.91 The Principles provide that “state
limitations must be in accordance with the law; based on a
legitimate objective; strictly necessary in a democratic society; the
least restrictive and intrusive means available; and not arbitrary,
unreasonable, or discriminatory.”92 A party to the ICCPR would
89 I do not consider whether the jus cogens principle applies, as the terms of
the ICCPR itself suggest the right to emigrate is not a peremptory norm of
international law.
90 ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 5(1).
91 See United Nations Economic and Social Council, The Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984)
[hereinafter Siracusa Principles] (stating the United Nation’s position of
derogation and limits on human rights).
92 Gostin & Berkman, supra note 56, at 146.
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also have to comply with its equal treatment stricture, and so
would have to refrain from “any act” that withdraws an ICCPR
right from some group on a discriminatory basis.
Finally, even if later, more specific conventions did displace
earlier, more general human rights conventions to some degree,
that degree must be limited to what the language of the later
conventions clearly compels. Given the fundamental nature of the
right to exit and the emphatic statements in the UDHR and the
ICCPR as to their applicability to “everyone,” a conservative
approach is required in interpreting any provisions of the CRC or
the Hague Convention that could derogate from that right for
children. As explained above, the CRC and Hague Convention
passages cited in support of the DPP Principle are quite vague and
thus open to multiple interpretations, including interpretations
that favor international adoption for any child for whom an
equally good domestic adoption is not presently available. Those
latter interpretations are compelled by a properly conservative
approach to applying the language, in light of the strong
presumption in favor of a right to emigrate that the UDHR and
ICCPR create.
4.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE

The right of emigration has not received a great deal of
attention in legal proceedings, international diplomacy, or legal
scholarship. This lack of attention might be in part because
denying adult citizens freedom to leave per se is uncommon. As
discussed below, nations do have reasons to prefer that particular
people not leave their territory. But they are more likely either to
accept that they cannot prevent such persons from leaving or to
hold such persons in a detention facility, rather than trying to
prevent exit by denying a passport or refusing to let them board a
plane or train, and in the latter case complaints are likely to rest on
the right against unlawful detention. Another likely part of the
explanation is that a far greater restriction on freedom of
international migration is the limit on immigration that most
countries impose.
Immigration policies and state practices
regarding refugees and asylum seekers receive enormous attention
in public and scholarly discourse and in legal tribunals.
It is possible, though, to discern some prevailing views about
the permissibility of specific reasons for denying freedom to
emigrate and about the general standards by which to judge any
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specific restrictions. Clues appear in the Siracusa Principles, in
published decisions of international human rights tribunals and
domestic courts, and in scholarly writing about the right to
emigrate. This Part reviews those sources of interpretation. As an
initial matter, though, it considers when the right should even
come in to play for non-autonomous right holders who do not
themselves decide that they want to emigrate.
4.1. Non-autonomous Persons’ Right to Emigrate
The ICCPR Rules of Procedure contemplate that a
representative will assert rights on behalf of a right holder who “is
unable to submit the communication personally.”93 The Rules
thereby confirm that the “everyone” upon whom the Convention
bestows civil rights is not limited to autonomous persons, but
rather really means everyone. The Convention and Rules say
nothing further, however, about the circumstances in which
someone may file a complaint on behalf of another person.
Presumably the assumption was that it would happen when and
only when that other person would have submitted the
communication himself if able.
To guard against random applications for relief on behalf of
incompetent persons, the HRC should therefore require a prima
facie showing by a purported representative that a) the right
holder’s situation is such that he or she likely would assert a
particular right against particular state action if able to do so, and
b) the purported representative is an appropriate agent for the
right holder. The first requirement would call on the filer to
present evidence that some state of affairs other than the status quo
would be substantially better for the right holder and that it would
be possible to secure that state of affairs but for the state action or
policy alleged to violate a Convention right.
The second
requirement might be satisfied with evidence that the
representative is a responsible party genuinely concerned with the
welfare of the right holder and without conflict of interests.94
ROP, supra note 83, at R. 90.
Cf. S.P., D.P., & A.T. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23715/94, 94 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep 31 (1997) (approving petition on behalf of children that
a lawyer filed on his own initiative, and stating that “[t]he Commission has
examined whether other or more appropriate representation exists or is available,
the nature of the links between Mr. Clements and the children, the object and
scope of the application introduced on their behalf and whether there are any
conflicts of interest”).
93
94
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Because the country being charged with violating incompetent
persons’ right to emigrate has control over those persons, over
access to them, and over information about their situation, no more
than a prima facie showing should be required to initiate an HRC
proceeding.
Thus, suppose some developing Country X were holding a
great number of mentally disabled adults, abandoned by their
families, in state-run institutional facilities of very poor quality.
Suppose further that a private organization in highly-developed
Country Y created a first-rate rehabilitative community for
mentally disabled adults, one where patients lived in a family
setting and received the best services and training known to
mankind, and that it had plenty of room to welcome new residents.
Suppose, finally, that the organization asked the proper authorities
in Country X to permit a certain number of the mentally disabled
adults there to emigrate to Country Y and enter into this facility,
but Country X refused. Country X asserted concerns about the
disabled adults’ welfare, but observers believe the real reason for
the refusal is that leaders thought accepting the offer would
wound national pride, implying that Country X was not properly
caring for its dependent citizens. If the organization then went to
the HRC, and if it could make a prima facie showing of 1) the poor
conditions in Country X’s facility; 2) the possibility for a much
better life in Country Y; and 3) its own bona fides, then the HRC
should accept a complaint submitted by the organization as
representative for the disabled adults, alleging a violation of the
right to emigrate. For the rights of such adults to be at all
meaningful, it must be possible for someone to assert their rights in
their behalf, and their current legal custodian cannot be relied on to
do so, because that custodian (the government of Country X) is the
very party thought to be violating the individuals’ rights.
Accepting the petition would not be the end of the matter, of
course; the HRC would then invite Country X to proffer a defense
of its actions.
The same analysis should apply in the case of young children
living in orphanages, other state facilities, or on streets in
developing countries.95 Persons and organizations who can
95 Older would-be adoptees’ own expressed wishes might suffice to
legitimate a complaint brought in their behalf by would-be adopters. I bracket
here questions that would arise if adolescents asserted a right to emigrate even
outside the adoption context, perhaps to escape from parental custody. When
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demonstrate a genuine concern for their welfare should be able to
act in a representative capacity for them, individually and/or as a
class, and assert their right to leave the country to pursue available
opportunities for a family life, education, and other basic goods.
They should simply have to make a prima facie showing that
current conditions and future prospects for the children are very
poor in their country of origin, and that opportunities for a much
better life are available to them elsewhere. This showing would
shift the burden, as explained below, onto the state to justify any
obstacles it has created to the children’s migration.
4.2. Interpreting Bases for Restricting the Right
The ICCPR specifies exclusive bases upon which it might be
permissible to restrict any person’s right to leave his native
country: “those which are provided by law, are necessary to
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 96 There
is not a great deal of guidance on the meaning of key terms in this
statement, but I collect here what exists.
4.2.1. The Siracusa Principles
In 1984, a group of NGOs sponsored an international
conference bringing together many of the most respected experts
on international and human rights law, at which the experts
drafted interpretations of the limitation and derogation provisions
of the ICCPR. The resulting Siracusa Principles are widely viewed
as authoritative.97 The Principles contain both general guidance for
applying all exceptions to the Convention’s rights pronouncements
and interpretations of each specific exception.

minors’ rights should change from interest-protecting to choice-protecting is a
question that arises in numerous contexts. Answering it is not necessary in order
to analyze the interest-protecting rights of young children. On the distinction
between and justifications for these types of rights, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN app. A (2006).
96 ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 12.
97 See Daniel R. Mekonnen, Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing as a Challenge to
Human Rights, 5 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 1, 7-8 (2010-11) (describing Siracusa
Principles that permit limitations of human rights when there is legitimate public
health concern).
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4.2.1.1. General guidance
The general guidance makes clear that exceptions to the
Convention’s rights are disfavored:
 “No limitations or grounds for applying them to rights
guaranteed by the Covenant are permitted other than
those contained in the terms of the Covenant itself.”
 “All limitation clauses shall be interpreted strictly and
in favour of the rights at issue.”
 “In applying a limitation, a State shall use no more
restrictive means than are required for the achievement
of the purpose of the limitation.”
 “Every limitation imposed shall be subject to the
possibility of challenge to and remedy against its
abusive application.” 98
The general guidance imposes on the state the burden of
demonstrating the need for any restriction, rather than putting on
the individual the burden of proving that a restriction is
unreasonable:
 “The burden of justifying a limitation upon a right
guaranteed under the Covenant lies with the State.”
 “Any assessment as to the necessity of a limitation shall
be made on objective considerations.” 99
And the general guidance mandates that any restrictions be
generally applicable rather than discriminatory:
 “No limitation on a right recognized by the Covenant
shall discriminate contrary to article 2, paragraph I
[‘without distinction of any kind’].”
 “No limitation on the exercise of human rights shall be
made unless provided for by national law of general
application . . .”
 “No limitation shall be applied in an arbitrary
manner.”100
Under these general guiding principles, any nation must be
susceptible to being called to account to the HRC for any restriction
it imposes on children’s freedom to emigrate, including any
obstacles to international adoption. It must present objective
evidence that the restriction is necessary to serve one of the few
98
99
100

Siracusa Principles, supra note 91.
Id.
Id.
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exceptions that the Convention contains. It must show that it
cannot protect the state interest embodied in the exception without
restricting the right to emigrate. And it must apply the restriction
evenhandedly to all citizens whenever doing so would serve that
state interest, not just impose it on children arbitrarily.
4.2.1.2. Guidance on specific exceptions
Article 12 of the ICCPR recognizes just five possible bases upon
which the right to emigrate might permissibly be restricted:
national security, public order, public morals, public health, and
the rights and freedoms of others. The drafters originally
considered and then rejected additional bases, such as control of
migrant workers and “the general welfare.”101 As to each
exception the Convention does allow, the Siracusa Principles
provide interpretive guidance.
Regarding national security, the Principles permit derogation
only when necessary “to protect the existence of the nation, its
territorial integrity or political independence against force or threat
of force.” That exception clearly does not authorize restrictions on
international adoption.
The Principles define “public order” to mean “the sum of rules
which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental
principles on which society is founded.” They qualify this by
stating that public order necessarily entails respect for human
rights, so a country signatory could not invoke “fundamental
principles” that inherently entail denial of human rights to some
people. The Principles state further with respect to public order
that the term “shall be interpreted in the context of the purpose of
the particular human right which is limited on this ground.” This
guidance on the whole suggests that any state restricting the right
of emigration would have to demonstrate, based on objective
evidence, that doing so is necessary for the continued functioning
of the society or to preserve fundamental, human-rights-respecting
principles upon which the society is founded.102
It is wholly implausible, and certainly not supportable by
objective evidence, to suggest that any society would cease to
function if a tiny percentage of its children emigrate; indeed
101 See Barist et al., supra note 67, at 388–89 (detailing the original restrictions
found in the ICCPR).
102 Cf. id. at 405 (stating that the ICCPR drafters substituted “public order” for
“public safety,” on the assumption that the former was more restrictive).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/4

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

231

emigration of orphaned children eases a burden on the society, and
any threat emigration poses to a society would seem much greater
in the case of able adults, particularly educated adults. A
fundamental principle that “the state owns the people born on its
territory” would not be respectful of human rights, and it is
difficult to imagine what other fundamental principle upon which
a society is founded is threatened by emigration of unparented
infants. The social contract-related principle of “fair dealing,”
under which members of a society have a duty to reciprocate for
benefits they have received, might be a principle upon which any
society is founded, but it is generally understood to apply only so
long as one remains within the same society and clearly would
apply with greater force to adults seeking to emigrate than to
infants.103
“Public morals” appears closely related to the idea of
fundamental principles, and the Principles emphasize that with
this potentially capacious grounds for exception the state must
“demonstrate that the limitation in question is essential to the
maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the
community.”104 They also reiterate that, as with an exception on
any other specified basis, any restriction justified in public morals
terms must be applied in a non-discriminatory way, and so would
have to extend to both adults and children. As such, the points
made above regarding public order would apply here as well.
Public health is a more promising basis for justifying
restrictions on international adoption. The Principles state that it
“may be invoked as a ground for limiting certain rights in order to
allow a State to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the
health of the population or individual members of the
population.”105 Sending countries are certainly permitted to take
measures aimed at protecting the health and safety of children who
might be adopted. And some nations have created obstacles to the
emigration of adults avowedly on grounds of public health (in the
case of quarantine) or individual safety (e.g., the Philippines’
prohibition on international marriage brokers, discussed below).
But pursuant to the general guidelines presented above, no state
may simply toss out the word “trafficking” and thereby justify
103 See John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW
PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964).
104 Siracusa Principles, supra note 91.
105 Id.
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severe restrictions on, or prohibition of, international adoption, as
can and does occur within the CRC framework.106 A complaint
against such sending-countries’ policies before the HRC would
force such a nation to present objective evidence that a) the danger
to children is substantial, b) the state cannot address the danger by
means short of denying the right to emigrate, c) the state applies
the restriction no more broadly than is strictly necessary, and d)
the state either applies the same restriction on emigration to adults
who are in danger of trafficking or can rationally and convincingly
explain the difference in the treatment of adults and children.107
Finally, as to rights and freedoms of others, the Principles state
that these may include rights and freedoms that do not arise from
the ICCPR itself, but might instead derive from other sources.
They qualify this, however, by saying the ICCPR itself is assumed
“to protect the most fundamental rights and freedoms.” 108 The
only other guidance is that a restriction on human rights “shall not
be used to protect the State and its officials from public opinion or
criticism.”109 This last point suggests that no state could defend
restrictions on international adoption on the grounds that the
practice embarrasses the state or its leaders or exposes them to
criticism.
A right of others that a country is more likely to invoke is that
of birth parents to maintain a relationship with their children.110

106 See, e.g., Reservation of Argentina to Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (stating that Argentina
would not apply any of the CRC Article 21 paragraphs relating to international
adoption, because “before they can be applied a strict mechanism must exist for
the legal protection of children in matters of inter-country adoption, in order to
prevent trafficking in and the sale of children”).
107 Applying the non-discrimination principle is more complex in a context
where the restriction is truly necessary to spare the right-holder from serious
harm. Presumably if a state could satisfy a), b) and c), representatives would not
have brought the challenge in the first place, or they would withdraw their
complaint after the state made its child welfare case. Alternatively, the tribunal
might dismiss on standing-type grounds a complaint that ultimately comes down
to “you are protecting us but not others.” On the other hand, the antidiscrimination rule and principle always serves as a useful check against sloppy
empiricism or legal analysis.
108 Siracusa Principles, supra note 91.
109 Id.
110 Recognition of such a right is widespread, but not universal. See HOWELL,
supra note 18, at 50-51 (discussing certain African tribes). For an argument on
theoretical grounds against the belief that birth parents are entitled to be the legal
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That right might justify obstacles to international adoption aimed
at ensuring that no child ostensibly available for international
adoption is actually wanted by his or her birth parents and has a
substantial chance of being able safely to return to them within a
reasonable period of time.111 Again, though, a complaint before the
HRC would force a state to demonstrate a substantial empirical
basis for this concern and that there is no way to address it except
by the restrictions imposed, or in other words that the measures
taken are the least restrictive way of addressing the concern. A
substantial-risk requirement arises from the general aversion to
restrictions, from the state’s burden to prove necessity and
compelling reason, and from the non-discrimination mandate,
insofar as the HRC would undoubtedly impose a substantial-risk
test in any situation involving adults, such as quarantine.
In sum, then, judging simply from the text of the ICCPR and
the Siracusa Principles, the permitted bases for restricting the right
to emigrate that could plausibly apply to international adoption
are just children’s safety and parents’ rights. Invoking the ICCPR
would force states to do something they currently appear to
suppose they have no need to do—that is, present persuasive
evidence of a sufficiently substantial problem and show that they
cannot avoid the problem by policies that are less restrictive of
international adoption. A less restrictive policy would include one
that applies to a smaller group of children, if the evidence suggests
the danger of injury to children or deprivation of parental rights
exists only for an identifiable subset of all children as to whom
international adoption is sought (e.g., those for whom adoption is
sought other than through an official agency or properly licensed
intermediary). Part 5 below addresses specific rationales for limits
on inter-country adoption in more depth.
4.2.2. Adjudication of Obstacles to Exit
The U.N.’s Human Rights Committee adjudicates complaints
about violations of the ICCPR. It has issued just a dozen or so
decisions on the right to leave one’s country. Most involved a
parents of their offspring regardless of whether this is in the children’s best
interests, see DWYER, supra note 95.
111 Cf. Maryl Sattler, The Problem of Parental Relocation: Closing the Loophole in
the Law of International Child Abduction, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1709 (2010)
(discussing the tests U.S. courts have applied to determine whether one parent
may relocate internationally over the objection of the other parent).
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country’s denying a passport to a national living at home or abroad
and then incurring a charge of violating ICCPR Article 12 because
absence of a passport inhibits international travel. The HRC found
a violation and upheld the complaint in all but one case in which
the charged nation had in fact inhibited its national from moving
across national borders.112 The typical apparent government
motivation is political retribution against critics of the regime in
power, and usually the native country does not even try to defend
its actions.113 In none of its decisions did the Committee even
entertain the idea that political opposition or published criticism of
government could constitute a threat to national security, public
order, or any other legitimate concern of the state.
The one decision that upheld a passport denial involved an
adult citizen of Finland who had failed to report for compulsory
112 See González del Río v. Peru, U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. 1721, Nov. 1, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Part II) (stating that Peru restricted freedom
of movement by leaving an arrest warrant pending for seven years); Mabel
Pereira Montero v. Uruguay, Communication No. 106/1981, UN Doc. Supp. No.
40 (A/38/40), at 186 (1983) (describing a violation when Uruguay failed to renew
a passport without justification); Samuel Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay,
Communication No. 77/1980, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40), at 166 (1983)
(holding that a citizen of Uruguay living in Mexico was improperly denied a
passport without justification); Carlos Varela Nunez v. Uruguay, Communication
No. 108/1981, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40), at 225 (1983) (finding that
Uruguay improperly revoked the passport of a journalist living in the United
States); Sophie Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights
Committee 157-60, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/40
(Sept. 22, 1982), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs
/session37/13-57.htm (holding that a Uruguayan national living in Mexico was
improperly denied a passport renewal). In one decision, the Committee found
that the complainant was not actually denied a passport nor inhibited in his
travels. Essono Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 414/1990,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (1994).
113 See, e.g., Oló Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, 2 Report of the Human
Rights Committee 183-88, P9.3, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc.
A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994), available at http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx?
ConvType=12&docType=36 (indicating that the accused nation denied factual
allegations rather than trying to defend denial of passport and detention);
Lichtensztejn, supra note 112 (noting that the state did not respond to charges
lodged by critic of Uruguayan government who was denied a passport); Vidal
Martins, supra note 112 (noting that no justification was offered for denying
passport to journalist). In some of these cases, the offending nation had gone
beyond denying a passport to arresting and incarcerating political opponents or
critics. See, e.g., Chiiko Bwalya v. Zambia, Communication No. 314/1988, ¶ 6.6,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (1993) (stating that the leader of opposition
party had been jailed); Nqalula Mpandanjila et al. v. Zaire, Communication No.
138/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40), at 121 (1986) (detailing the
detention of citizens after a critical open letter to the government).
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military service when called.114 The Committee noted agreement
by the Convention state parties, as reflected in the travaux
preparatoires, “that the right to leave the country could not be
claimed . . . in order to avoid such obligations as national
service.”115 It concluded that enforcing the nation’s military service
rules, by denying a passport if necessary to produce compliance,
was “necessary for the protection of national security and public
order,” was non-discriminatory, and did not infringe any other
rights under the Covenant.116 Presumably, the HRC would not
find in the case of unparented babies and infants that states may
justify holding them captive until adulthood by pointing to the
expectation that they will one day serve in the military or
otherwise fulfill some obligation to the state. A duty of military
service arises, if at all, only for those who have reached adulthood
after enjoying a nation’s public benefits throughout their
upbringing.
In one other case of special significance, the HRC found that
Peru had violated a citizen’s ICCPR right to emigrate by delaying
for too long legal action prerequisite to his departure. The
government had issued an arrest warrant against the man but then
never arrested him and instead refused him permission to leave
the country for the next seven years, citing the outstanding warrant
for his arrest as the reason. The Committee stated:
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 12, the right to leave any
country may be restricted, primarily, on grounds of
national security and public order (ordre public). The
Committee considers that pending judicial proceedings
may justify restrictions on an individual’s right to leave his
country. But where the judicial proceedings are unduly
delayed, a constraint upon the right to leave the country is
thus not justified . . . . The Committee considers that this
situation violates the author’s rights under article 12,
paragraph 2 . . . .117

114 Peltonen v. Finland, 2 U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Committee 238-43,
PP2.1, ¶ 8.4, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (Sept. 21,
1994) (holding that there was no violation in denying the passport for failure to
participate in military service).
115 Id. ¶ 8.3.
116 Id. ¶ 8.4.
117 del Río v. Peru, supra note 112, ¶ 5.3.
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An advocate for a child for whom the adoption process is
unduly prolonged might cite this case as precedent for the broader
principle that unjustified delay in legal or administrative
proceedings can constitute a violation of Article 12, even if a
government purports to be permitting international adoptions.
This passage, like that in other decisions of the Committee,
reaffirms that exceptions to the right to emigrate are extremely
limited, and that the burden is on the state to demonstrate that an
enumerated exception applies.118
4.2.3. Scholarly Writing
The right to emigrate has also received little attention from
scholars. It is generally taken as a given, rather than analyzed in
any depth, that denying any adults the freedom to emigrate
patently violates their human rights, absent certain sorts of
compelling circumstances. Scholars have accepted as sufficiently
compelling a real threat of spreading deadly disease, but endorse
quarantine only with due process protection against unnecessary
denial of freedom.119 On the other hand, scholars have rejected as
bases for denying the right to emigrate resource-type concerns,
such as labor shortage120 or loss of the most well-educated or
talented citizens (i.e., “brain drain” and “muscle drain”). Thus, in
assessing how poor countries can respond to the “talent-forcitizenship exchange” that robs them of the payoff for investing in
development of their star athletes come Olympics time, Ayalet
Shachar writes:
Her home country may plead with her to stay or make
promises to further invest in her development as an athlete,
but as a cold legal matter, it cannot force her to stay.
International law declarations and many domestic
constitutions pronounce that individuals have a basic right
to leave their country.121
118 See also Bwalya, supra note 113, ¶ 2.5 (discussing the case of a political
activist declared a danger to national security, prompting restriction).
119 See, e.g., Gregory P. Campbell, Global H1N1 Pandemic, Quarantine Law, and
the Due Process Conflict, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 497, 516-18 (2011) (stating that the
IHR permits quarantine in the case of serious health risks).
120 See, e.g., Huling, supra note 61, at 659 (discussing UDHR rules that protect
individual rights by not allowing employers to keep workers’ passports).
121 Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for
Talent, 120 YALE L.J. 2088, 2126 (2011). Cf. Oberman, supra note 62 (considering
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What goes without saying is the insufficiency in the case of
adults of certain reasons a country might have for blocking
emigration such as protecting national pride, resisting neocolonialism, hoping it will induce other nations to give more aid,
concern that adult émigrés are being commodified, or preserving
family-formation opportunities for those who remain in the
country. There is, implicitly, regarding adults, complete rejection
today of the notion that states own their citizens and are
empowered to limit their freedom to serve aims of the state or
interests of other persons.122
5.

APPLYING THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE TO INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION

This final Part examines, in light of the guidance just rehearsed,
common explanations or justifications for countries’ imposing
restrictions on international adoption. The analysis will show that
appeal to general human rights simplifies the international
adoption issue somewhat, by ruling out certain kinds of
considerations. The issue remains complex, however, so the
analysis here is meant to be preliminary, intended to begin a
conversation within a new, general-human-rights normative
framework. I do not attempt an exhaustive analysis of restrictions
on international adoption. My aims in this Article are to argue for
a new analytical and advocacy framework, as I have done in Parts
1 to 3; to identify principles that should guide application of the
relevant general rights, as I have done in Part 4; and, in this Part, to
demonstrate how this new framework changes the status and
plausibility of common justifications for restrictions on
international adoption. I will ask as to each potential justification
whether the international community would accept it as sufficient
to block the emigration of any adults, and in particular any adults
only immigration restrictions by receiving states as an ethical state response to
brain drain, but noting parenthetically that sending countries might be justified in
restricting emigration in very limited circumstances, such as when the person
seeking to emigrate clearly owes a duty to the native country to repay benefits
received, like state-provided education).
122 Cf. Ruth Rubio-Marín, Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State:
Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 122 (2006) (“Today . . . the prevailing liberal ethos includes the
subject’s rights to leave the country and change nationality at least as long as there
is another country willing to take the subject . . . . [T]he general attitude towards
those who have left is disinterest . . . .”).
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seeking to emigrate for purposes of family formation. I begin the
analysis with reasons having to do with supposed interests of the
state, follow this with concerns about the rights or interests of
persons other than the children who could be adopted, and end
with justifications ostensibly resting on the children’s welfare.
5.1. State Interests
5.1.1. National Pride
Russian President Putin gave indication that his support for the
ban on American adoption of Russian-born children arose from his
view that the practice is demeaning for Russia.123 South Korea has
in recent years imposed a strong domestic placement preference,
even though domestic adoption opportunities fall far short of need,
in part because government leaders think it reflects poorly on the
nation that native children must leave the country to find a
home.124 Many observers of international adoption perceive this
ego-protecting motivation as the dominant one behind imposition
of restrictions in other countries as well.125
This motivation falls into the category of patently illicit under
the ICCPR right of emigration. It is clearly not within any of the
ICCPR’s enumerated bases for derogation. No country would
attempt to justify refusing to allow women to leave for marriage
purposes by asserting that their doing so constitutes an insult to
the nation, even though that would seem even truer in the case of
adult emigration. There is no shortage of potential husbands for
women in the former Soviet Union, so the desire of hundreds of
thousands of Russian women to find a husband abroad reflects
123 See Herszenhorn & Eckholm, supra note 12 (“’There are probably many
places in the world where living standards are better than ours,‘ Mr. Putin said.
’So what? Shall we send all children there, or move there ourselves?’”).
124 See Donald Kirk, South Korea Tries to Recall a U.S. Adoption, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 23, 2013, www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013
/0123/South-Korea-tries-to-recall-a-US-adoption (discussing Korea’s motivations
in opposing adoption by foreign couples because of shame in inability to place its
children nationally).
125 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 161, 171; John Triseliotis, ”Inter-country
Adoption: In Whose Best Interest?,” in INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION: PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCES, supra note 35, 131 (stating that many in the Third World view intercountry adoptions as “confirming their inferiority and inadequacy”); Bartholet,
supra note 36, at 374–75; Bartholet, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing China, the African
Child Policy Forum, and the condemnation of international adoptions for reasons
of national pride).
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poorly on Russian men and on former Soviet states as nations, yet
these states must permit the women to leave. Analogously, if a
man forcibly holds his girlfriend captive because her departure to
pursue better marriage prospects would wound his pride, his
conduct is abuse, pure and simple, not commendable or even
tolerable. Holding children hostage to protect national pride is no
less a form of human abuse.
5.1.2. Neo-Colonialism
Some intercountry adoption critics complain that the practice is
imperialistic.126 Shani King writes: “Little attention is paid in legal
scholarship . . . to the argument that industrialized countries are
exploiting developing countries and stealing their national
resources, i.e., their healthy children.”127 Leaders of some third
world countries have explained decisions to restrict or prohibit the
practice in terms of protest against this modern-day form of
exploitation and resource stealing.128 John Triseliotis reports that,
for many in developing countries, inter-country adoptions
“epitomize the exercise of influence and control by the more
powerful nations who are seen as ‘robbing’ Third World countries
of their children.”129 Extremists characterize it as genocide,

126 See, e.g., Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the
Best Interests of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 349 (2004) (characterizing
international adoption of children by wealthier countries’ citizens as colonialist
acquisition of national resources); Ryiah Lilith, Buying a Wife But Saving a Child: A
Deconstruction of Popular Rhetoric and Legal Analysis of Mail-Order Brides and
Intercountry Adoption, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 229 (2000-2001) (purporting to
reveal the “imperialism and commodification underlying intercountry
adoptions”).
127 King, supra note 2, at 436. See also id. at 414 (tying intercountry adoption to
“our imperialist orientation toward the world”).
128 See, e.g., Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 131 (linking adoption to a sense of
self-righteousness); Yngvesson, supra note 19, at 216-17 (citing authorities in
developing countries who refer to children as a nation’s resources). See also King,
supra note 2, at 434-35 (providing other sources that document a concern about the
appearance of imperialism motivating international agencies and national
governments to adopt positions hostile to international adoption).
129 Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 131 (explaining intercountry adoption in
terms of a need to “rescue” children). See also Hearst, supra note 1, at 333
(discussing view by some critics of transnational adoption that such practice is a
global market for human beings).
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destroying communities and cultures by removing the next
generation.130
Those leveling a neo-colonialism charge uniformly fail to
explain how an exploitation charge could apply to countries or
regions with a severe over-population problem and in
circumstances where the conditions in which children live produce
very bad outcomes for them and, in turn, for their society. None
have offered any evidence that any sending countries or cultural
communities have suffered from the departure of children from
orphanages. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that sending
countries benefit economically from international adoption,
because it reduces their costs of caring for unparented children,
injects foreign currency through adopters’ travel expenses and fees
paid to local agencies, and triggers voluntary contributions and
purchases of local products by adopting parents and adopted
children.131 Ultimately, the imperialism charge collapses into
assertion of national pride, dismissed above.
Moreover, the strategy of appealing to more general rights held
by all, and demanding justifications that would apply to all, makes
evident that this charge is also simply inapt and insufficient even if
there were any empirical basis for it. A neo-colonial exploitation
charge would be more plausible in regard to the practice of
international marriage, that is, a charge that the practice principally
consists of western men extracting a valuable “resource” (i.e.,
women) from poor countries.132 Though a nation might well suffer
from the mass departure of its healthy, educated women,
especially a nation like China experiencing a serious shortfall of

130 Hearst, supra note 1, at 330 (“[M]any groups view the placement of
children outside of their boundaries as tantamount to genocide.”).
131 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 182 (discussing fiscal burdens and benefits
of adoption); Barbara Stark, Baby Girls From China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 1231, 1270 (2003) (pointing out that roughly a billion dollars
goes each year from the U.S. to China as a result of adoptive parents buying
cultural items to give to their adopted children); Cost to Adopt from China,
FAMLILIES THRU INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://www.ftia.org/china/costs.asp (advising prospective adopters that they
will need to make a “donation” of over $5,000 to their child’s orphanage and pay
over $2,000 to Chinese officials, and that an adopting couple can expect to spend
nearly $5,000 on living and traveling expenses while in China).
132
See Lilith, supra note 126, at 228-29 (maintaining that it is actually more
common for the mail-order bride phenomenon to be viewed as exploitative neocolonialism).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/4

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

241

marriageable women,133 no one suggests that this is a reason to
curtail the right of women to emigrate. Likewise, many people
complain that “talent drain” harms poor countries, and some
characterize it as neo-colonialist exploitation,134 yet no one
launches an argument on this basis per se for denying the highlyeducated and talented a right of emigration. Scholars take as given
that poor countries would violate human rights by trying to hold
their adult talent pool captive, absent a legitimate contractual
obligation that locally-trained adults owe to their country. It
would smack of commodifying and enslaving human beings.
Within the general rights framework, supporters of international
adoption can persuasively argue that it is no justification for
violating any persons’ right to emigrate that a country views them
as a valuable national or cultural-community resource. If it is not a
justification in the case of adults, in whom a country is more likely
already to have invested substantially, then it cannot be in the case
of children.
5.2. Other Persons in Sending Countries
5.2.1. Children Left Behind
Related to the charge of exploitation is the complaint that
international adoption changes the lives of only a tiny percentage
of all needy children in sending countries, and not necessarily the
very neediest, while doing nothing to help the children who are
not adopted or the country more generally.135 In fact, some suggest

133 See Simon Rabinovitch, China Takes Baby Steps in Narrowing Gender
Imbalance, REUTERS (June 3, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2010/06/03/us-china-sex-imbalance-idUSTRE65236520100603 (“More than 24
million Chinese men of marrying age could find themselves without spouses in
2020 . . . .”). Significantly, although China has a serious gender imbalance in its
population, the market for Internet brides from China is thriving. A Google
search for “Chinese brides” yields countless marriage broker sites, such as
ChnLove.com, ChineseLoveLinks.com, and ChineseWomenDating.com.
134 See Shachar, supra note 121, at 2129 (discussing professional soccer
leagues’ recruitment of young players).
135 See, e.g., Hearst, supra note 1, at 333 (alleging that transnational adoption
harms efforts to improve support for local community based projects); Bergquist,
supra note 126, at 349-50 (“[I]nternational adoption at best does not address
precipitating social conditions, providing instead a short term and arguably
minimal impact on the problem of homelessness and poverty for children. At
worst, it allows countries to abdicate responsibility for enacting sociopolitical
change to secure the well-being of all children . . . .”); King, supra note 2, at 425,
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it “retards the growth of infrastructure within countries that could
care for children in-country.”136
This complaint overlooks the just-mentioned ways in which
international adoption does actually help those who remain in the
sending country, in particular by lessening the number of children
in state custody, thereby freeing up more of the sending country’s
resources for spending on support for parents and other familypreserving measures, and by triggering substantial infusion of
foreign currency from adopters. In addition, this complaint suffers
from implicitly suggesting that children who could leave should be
kept hostage, to try to induce those who care about the suffering in
poor countries to take action aimed at improving conditions in the
sending country. The imagined causal chain of events from closing
off adoption to greater foreign investment is difficult to draw, but
even if it were clearer, this strategy would be morally indefensible
and unsupported by any ICCPR exception. That becomes evident
when we, again, situate adoption within the broader context of
emigration. It could equally be said of a prohibition on any adults
leaving a country that it might inspire other nations or wealthy
individuals in other nations to provide aid to that country. But
even if this speculation were the least bit realistic, no one would
maintain that this is a valid and sufficient reason for a country’s
infringing adults’ rights to leave their native country and change
their nationality. Likewise, no one would contend that adults
should be denied freedom to exit for marriage purposes because
the best leave and the most unfortunate remain behind. It should
be no more plausible to contend that a country should shut down
foreign adoption because most adopters seek healthy infants and
pass over special needs and older children.

428, 461 (complaining that international adoption fails to address some
overarching issues for disadvantaged children).
136 King, supra note 2, at 465 (suggesting that mandatory donations to
countries could help assuage critics of international adoption). See also Triseliotis,
supra note 125, at 132. David Smolin maintains that open inter-country adoption
policies hurt older and special-needs children in orphanages because they are
passed over in favor of healthy infants. Smolin, supra note 72, at 242-43. He does
not explain, however, how restrictions on international adoption help older or
special-needs children get adopted. To the extent they result in raising the
average age of adopted children, it would seem they do so only by forcing
unparented children to wait longer to join an adoptive family. Smolin also
asserts that inter-country adoption is almost always bad for older children,
because it is so disorienting. Id. at 238–39, 240.
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Some propose, as a way of addressing the supposed harm that
international adoption inflicts on poor countries, that adopters and
western governments pay a hefty tax for each international
adoption, which sending countries would in theory use to improve
Most
family-preservation and domestic adoption efforts.137
sending countries in effect already do this; the size of fees paid to
state agencies and orphanages undoubtedly far exceeds any costs
the sending country incurs in processing an adoption. Moreover,
those who propose an adoption tax do not consider whether
increasing the cost in this way would lower demand and therefore
produce no net gain to the sending country and a profound loss for
children who as a result are never adopted. They implicitly
assume that westerners wishing to adopt have unlimited money to
spend and that demand is inelastic, but we know that the current
high cost already deters many people.138
In addition, generalizing again makes the proposal
unpalatable: would those who support an adoption tax also
support an international marriage tax, by which countries that
‘supply’ brides for western men tax those men and/or their
government, perhaps to fund employment for potential domestic
husbands? There is in fact one example of a country imposing a
tax on brides; Turkmenistan for some years required foreign men
wanting to marry one of its women to pay a $50,000 fee, ostensibly
as a demonstration of sincerity that would help prevent trafficking.
Human rights organizations condemned the fee as a violation of
women’s human rights, and in 2005 the country eliminated it.139
Such a tax commodifies people, suggests that nations have some
proprietary interest in the humans that live within their borders for
which they must be compensated, and unjustifiably infringes
individuals’ right to exit the country in order to pursue a better life.
The proposal to tax inter-country adoption does all of these things
with respect to children. It is another illustration of how sui generis
thinking about children, encouraged by special-rights enactments,
137 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 464-65 (stating that some states currently
require donations be made to orphanages from which children are adopted).
138 See Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for Reform and
Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 30 (2010)
(explaining that costs for international adoption are prohibitively high for some
couples).
139 See generally Gulnoza Saidazimova, Turkmenistan: Marriage Gets Cheaper As
Turkmenbashi Drops $50,000 Dollar Foreigners’ Fee, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Jan. 10,
2005, 10:00 PM), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059210.html.
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leads to policies and ways of thinking no one would apply to
adults.
5.2.2. Profiteering
Russia’s ombudsman for children has defended that country’s
ban on adoption by Americans in part by charging that
international adoptions are driven by adoption agencies’ desire to
make money, citing the fees that range between $30,000 and
$50,000 that adopting parents typically pay.140 It is unclear whom
this harms, other than adoptive parents who pay the fees and
children who remain unparented because the high cost of adoption
deters other would-be adopters. It is also unclear how those high
fees could drive demand, which ultimately must come from
would-be parents, rather than deterring it.141 There are welldocumented reasons why westerners seek to adopt from other
countries, and they do not include wanting to pay a lot of money
or falling under the spell of adoption agency advertising.
Apart from the illogic of this objection, it simply would not
stand up upon being generalized to cover formation across
national borders of family bonds more generally. The proliferation
of international dating Internet sites suggests there is much money
to be made by charging fees to American and European men to
meet online and communicate with women in former Soviet
countries, Asia, and Latin America.142 Yet no country has enacted
legislation to ban marriage of its citizens to Americans or deny the
right to emigrate for marriage purposes, on the ground that these

140 See generally Herszenhorn, supra note 12 (discussing Russian official’s
suggestion that international adoptions are driven by profit motives). Cf. D.
Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption:
Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 352 (2005-2006) (“Prior to the
1990s, most international adoption agencies were philanthropic or missionary
organizations.
During the past twenty years, however, the number of
international adoption agencies in the United States has more than doubled, and
many facilitators are now private or for-profit companies and individual
entrepreneurs.”).
141 Others maintain that both birth parents and adopted parents are exploited
by the public and private agencies that control international adoption. See, e.g.,
Peter Selman, Adoption: A Cure for (too) Many Ills, in CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES
TO ADOPTION, supra note 2, at 270 (stressing the need for regulation of intercountry
adoption and higher ethical standards).
142 See Jane Kim, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the
Foreign-Bride Industry, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 443, 469 (2011) (stressing the size of the
international dating website market and its costs).
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marriage agencies are driven by profit motives. The presence of
market incentives for agencies to facilitate international family
formation in and of itself provides no justification for infringing
the right to emigrate.
5.2.3. Coercion of Parents
The more legitimate concern relating to money is that some
parents are induced to relinquish their children to adoption
intermediaries or agencies by proffered payments.143 This was
among the concerns that motivated creation of the Hague
Convention.144 There is debate about how substantial this concern
is today. Proponents of international adoption contend that the
concern rests on rumors or illogical extrapolation from a small
number of documented cases, and that with millions of children
already in orphanages or living on the streets because their parents
died or abandoned them there is little incentive for anyone to buy
or kidnap a child.145 Rather than wade into this empirical debate, I
want to make some different points.
First, even if this is a prevalent practice, it could be viewed as
parents exercising their rights rather than having them denied.
There is some tension between treating monetary inducement as a
basis for blocking adoptions and the standard assumption, which
provides the primary normative foundation for conferral of
parental rights, that parents know what is best for their children
and try always to do what is best for them. It entails some suspect
second-guessing of parents’ difficult decisions to relinquish their
143 See Blair, supra note 140, at 355-65 (describing the practice of an adoption
agency in Cambodia to induce parents to relinquish their babies by offering $50
and false promises of continuing contact).
144 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 178-79, 218 (explaining that financial
practices relating to adoptions in Guatemala, Romania, and elsewhere played a
role in development of the Hague Convention). See also Wardle, supra note 44, at
122-23 (discussing influences on the Hague Convention, including questionable
adoption methods in Romania).
145 See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 5, at 96 (contending that preventing
adoptions because of a small number of abuses is detrimental to children);
Wardle, supra note 44, at 144 (“Establishing safeguards and procedures for
stopping abuses existing in a small-but-sensational minority of international
adoptions are explicit objectives of the HCIA; one way to achieve those objectives
is to significantly reduce international adoptions, slowing them to a trickle of
exactingly screened, perfectly comfortable adoptions.”). See also Jini L. Roby &
Stacey A Shaw, The African Orphan Crisis and International Adoption, 51 SOCIAL
WORK 199, 200 (2006) (“[T]here are no documented cases of adoption trafficking
into the United States from Africa.”).
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newborn or infant child, which might in fact be the best thing for
that child and the rest of the family. This phenomenon is likely to
occur precisely in places where existence is truly marginal, where
parents fear for their children’s survival. Some parents and older
children in those countries might wonder how it is that they are
better off as a result of their ‘protectors’ imposing cumbersome
procedures designed to ensure that parents do not receive any
money in the process of separating from their youngest
offspring.146
Many would say this means the circumstances should change,
so that no parents would feel compelled for the good of their
family to “sell” their children.147 Instead of adopting children from
a desperately poor nation, we in the West should pour aid money
into the country to ensure that every family there can live a secure
existence in a normal home environment. This response suffers
from what I call the “Better World Fallacy,” the reasoning that if a
certain government policy (which could be, e.g., imprisoning
people for dealing drugs, removing children from abusive parents,
or any other law enforcement reaction to the dysfunctional
behavior that poverty and injustice produce) would be
unnecessary in a better world, then it should not exist in the actual
world. When dire poverty, famine, slums, uncontrolled infectious
diseases, civil war, child rape, and sex slavery no longer exist,
perhaps we can refuse to allow biological parents to relinquish
their children for international adoption. At present, however, it
cannot suffice to tell a child who is dying of starvation along with
her AIDS-infected parents, and who has been raped several times
while walking the five-mile road to the water spigot, that the state
146 Cf. David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights
Analysis, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 434 (2007) (“Should hungry or malnourished birth
parents, and their remaining children, be turned away with nothing, solely to
protect the purity of their consents?”). Smolin makes a strong case that when any
birth parents in the most impoverished countries of the world propose to
relinquish a child for adoption, they should be offered a sum of money sufficient
to allow them to retain their children. He suggests that this cost be passed onto
adoption applicants and speculates that it might amount to an additional three
thousand dollars or so per adoption. He would still allow international adoption,
but just require some greater effort to ensure poverty is not the only reason why
parents give up their child. See generally id. The proposal is appealing and his
reasoning forceful, but as explained above, there are normative and practical
problems with imposing a tax on adopters, and if the money had to come from
foreign government aid rather than from taxing adopters then the proposal would
suffer from the Better World Fallacy.
147 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 434; Yngvesson, supra note 19, at 213.
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did not permit her parents to place her for international adoption
at birth because it was worried about their autonomy.148
The ‘child buying’ reason for foreclosing foreign adoption also
suffers from the usual problem with prohibiting people from
engaging in highly-desired transactions for fear of harmful side
effects—namely, that it drives up the price where the transactions
remain legal and it gives rise to an illegal market where the law
prohibits them. The concern about parental coercion should
diminish the more open nations’ policies become with respect to
international adoption, because the natural over-supply of truly
orphaned children would eliminate any financial incentive to
approach parents who are living and who are capable of raising
their children. Within a global framework, UNICEF’s successful
pressuring of some nations to curtail international adoption must
make ‘baby buying’ more common in other nations that are more
receptive to international adoption, because it thereby becomes
more lucrative. Conversely, the most promising way to minimize
coercion of parents might be to induce a change of policy in
countries that have a great number of true orphans but currently
prohibit international adoption.149 Dramatically increasing the
number of true orphans available for international adoption should
reduce the price agencies and countries charge adopters and
eliminate or at least reduce the incentive for anyone to offer
parents money for relinquishing a child for adoption.150
In addition, generalizing the objection puts it in a much weaker
light. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of women creating profiles
on international marriage websites are motivated by their poor
economic circumstances in their country of origin rather than by
simply a desire for adventure or special attraction to American
men. Would Russia be justified in prohibiting these Internet
marriage brokers from operating in Russia or in refusing to permit
its young women to emigrate for marriage purposes because of a
148 See Jonathan Todres, A Child Rights-Based Approach to Reconstruction in
Haiti, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43, 67 (2010) (discussing dangers
children face in the poorest regions of the world).
149 Cf. Smolin, supra note 14, at 469-70 (noting that many potential sending
countries are closed to foreign adoption, including nearly all of Africa); Wardle,
supra note 44, at 116-17 (supplying data on the number of unparented children in
developing countries).
150 Cf. Smolin, supra note 14, at 492 (“[S]o long as adoption fees and donations
are large enough to provide a substantial incentive for child laundering, the
system will be vulnerable.”).
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concern that they are motivated to forego relationships in Russia
by the prospect of economic gain via international marriage? The
reality is that they will likely have much better lives in many ways
by emigrating and living in a western country, despite the
psychological and emotional costs of separating from their parents,
other family members, and friends. The legal system does not
second-guess and override their decisions, even though the
likelihood of a better life is probably not as great for adults through
marriage as it is for children through adoption; the rate of domestic
violence for ‘e-mail order brides’ is much higher than is the rate of
maltreatment for international adoptees, and adjustment to a
different culture, language, and way of life is undoubtedly more
difficult for foreign brides than it is for internationally adopted
infants.151
In light of the extraordinarily high success rate for international
adoptions,152 it appears that the real concern relating to money is
not a child welfare concern, but rather a concern for the long-term
happiness of biological parents in States of origin. But that
supposition about parental suffering has not been documented,
overlooks the suffering parents experience when their children
languish in orphanages or starve before their eyes, and in and of
itself cannot justify denying a right to children. Desperate parents
themselves might be much better off in the long run by placing
their child for adoption, as a result of knowing that their child is
not suffering the same fate they have endured. And if in the
process they also receive some money that might allow them to
feed their other children or themselves, it is not clear that
something wrong has occurred. Yes, it is horrible to think that any
parents and children could be better off as a result of parents’
parting with their children. But there are many places in the world
where horrible is the human condition, and shutting down
international adoption is not going to change that, just as
prohibiting international marriage would not change it. Adults are
151 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 54, at 1653-54, 1660 (discussing international
brides’ vulnerability to domestic violence); Kim, supra note 142, at 466–67, 474–75
(examining legislation passed in response to incidences of domestic violence with
mail order brides); Wechsler, supra note 138, at 4 (describing improvement in
quality of life for children adopted internationally).
152 See Stein et al., supra note 8, at 1431 (“For the vast majority of children who
are adopted today, the prognosis is excellent.
In cases in which the
developmental-behavioral outcome is problematic, diagnostic consideration
should be given to factors that are not related to the adoption history.”).
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entitled to make this difficult choice for themselves, based on their
assessment of what is best for them, and children should have the
analogous right of having someone make this choice on their
behalf, based on what is in their best interests.153
The most compelling reason states have for imposing
restrictions on international adoption might be the possibility that
parents have not actually consented to relinquish their children.
There is evidence that parents are sometimes defrauded into
turning over their children for adoption—for example, by false
promises that they can continue to have contact with their children
or would continue to benefit financially from the child’s
adoption.154 In those cases, an inference about the children’s
welfare based on the parents’ choice is less tenable. This
vulnerability to fraud does point to an additional problem with the
children’s pre-adoption situation, though—that is, parents’ radical
disempowerment, which must more generally diminish their
ability to care for all their children. Nevertheless, the HRC might
accept as legitimate any restrictions on international adoption truly
necessary to avoid defrauding of parents. As noted above, the
ICCPR lists protecting the rights of others among the permissible
bases for restricting the right of emigration. If the Committee
accepted that birth parents have some possessory right to their
children regardless of whether that is in the children’s best
interests, then it might find some restrictive adoption policies
warranted in some countries.
However, pursuant to the Siracusa Principles, the burden
would be on the country preventing children from emigrating to
present persuasive evidence that this is a sufficiently frequent
occurrence and that it cannot be stopped by other means. The state
would have to employ the least restrictive means to preventing
children from being taken from parents without the parents’ free
and informed consent. A procedural fix should suffice; foreclosing
foreign adoption altogether is grossly disproportionate. Whereas
within the special-rights framework of the CRC and Hague
153 See generally DWYER, supra note 95 (presenting a thorough theoretical
analysis of children’s moral rights in connection with state decision making about
their family relationships).
154 See Blair, supra note 140, at 357–58 (“Parents were sometimes told that they
could visit their child at an orphanage in Cambodia, or that a rich family would
raise their child in the United States and send the family money and photographs,
and that the child could petition for the parents’ immigration to the United States .
. . .”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

250

2/23/2014 2:52 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:1

Convention, a country can simply cite the DPP Principle and give
no further justification for shutting down inter-country adoption, a
challenge brought on behalf of children under the ICCPR would
force that country to present substantial evidence of a problem and
the necessity of a complete shutdown to address it. The country
would have to do this to overcome the strong presumption the
ICCPR creates in favor of children’s having a right to leave the
country to join a family and against the legitimacy of the state’s
creating obstacles to this. Notably, most countries that severely
restrict or prohibit foreign adoptions, including Russia, have never
claimed that this problem exists and underlies their policies.
5.3. Child Welfare Concerns
Certainly the ICCPR analysis must somehow uphold any
restrictions on children’s right of emigration necessary to prevent
adoptions that are not in their best interests, all things considered.
I am by no means suggesting in this Article that inter-country
adoption is the best option for every unparented child in poor
countries. The HRC might sensibly read “best interests of nonautonomous right holders” into the public health exception, or it
might permit a state to rebut representatives’ prima facie case for
asserting children’s right to emigrate by demonstrating that their
position is actually contrary to the children’s welfare, on the whole
and all things considered. It would be nonsensical to allow proxy
assertion of a right on behalf of children to produce a result that is
actually worse for them than an available alternative. General
rights also present the danger of harming non-autonomous
holders.
Particular aspects of children’s wellbeing that receive attention
include both red herrings and legitimate concerns. Even the
legitimate concerns, however, are far from sufficient to justify
categorically denying children without families the opportunity for
international adoption. The reality is that international adoptees
on the whole do very well, despite the special issues that arise for
them. The exceptions are mostly children who incurred substantial
developmental damage from their early experience in their country
of birth, in which case they would almost certainly have fared even
worse by remaining in their country of origin, where there are
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unlikely to be special services and medical care for special-needs
children.155
5.3.1. Providing Children for Parents Rather Than Parents for
Children
One of the oddest complaints about international adoption is
that it has transformed from a practice done for charitable reasons,
in reaction to the publicized plight of children orphaned by World
War II, the Vietnam War, and the Korean War, to a practice serving
the desires of adults in affluent nations who want to have children
but are unable to procreate.156 This simple story might reflect
reality to some degree, but it is hardly a complete or entirely
accurate account of adopting parents’ motivations.157 It omits, for
example, mention of the thousands of Americans who by choice
adopt special-needs children and the thousands who adopt even
though they already have biological offspring and could produce
more if they wished.158
The larger problem with this complaint, however, is the
unexamined premise that it is worse in some way for people to
adopt children when they truly desire a relationship with the
children rather than solely because they feel sorry for the children.
No one has argued explicitly that the supposedly self-interested
motivation of modern-day adopters is itself sufficient reason to
stop international adoption, but the purpose of alleging it is clearly
to add to the reasons for viewing international adoption in a
negative light.159 Yet if we place international adoption into the
155 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 103–07 (showing that the vast majority
of adopted children develop well); Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 124–27, 131.
156 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 72, at 242–43; Yngvesson, supra note 19, at 216;
Bergquist, supra note 126, at 350 (alleging “a shift from a child-centered to parentcentered focus in adoption”).
157 But see King, supra note 2, at 419–25 (telling a more complex historical
story).
158 See generally Herszenhorn, supra note 13. See also Wardle, supra note 44, at
115 (“[F]ew international transactions . . . compare with the selfless, charitable,
and compassionate act of responsible adults taking stranger children from foreign
countries and cultures into their homes, as members of their own families, and
assuming the obligation to feed, clothe, house, teach, love, nurture and protect the
children . . . .”).
159 See, e.g., Selman, supra note 141, at 258, 260 (insinuating that gratifying
childless couples has become the dominant motivation for international adoption,
at the expense of children’s welfare); Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 119 (“[A]
healthy motive is generally seen to be one that aims to provide a home for a needy
child rather than a child for a home.”).
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larger context of emigration for purpose of family formation, and
we ask what justifications might suffice for infringing anyone’s
right to leave their country of origin for that purpose, it
immediately becomes apparent how ironic is this charge. No
doubt, if one surveyed women who have come to the United States
for marriage to American men and asked, “Would you rather that
your husband married you because he really wanted a wife and
fell in love with you, or instead because he felt sorry for you?” the
uniform answer would be the former. A similar survey of adopted
children would undoubtedly produce a similar result—that is, they
would rather have been adopted because their parents really
wanted to have a parent-child relationship rather than because
their parents pitied them. The former motivation is more likely to
coincide with parents’ having a very positive view of the child, as a
blessing rather than a burden, and any child should prefer that.
Adoption proponents can turn this story on its head, arguing that
it is wonderful that the modern adopter truly wants a relationship
with the child and is more likely than the adopters of old to make
the child feel special and valued.
5.3.2. Trafficking
A clearly legitimate reason for imposing institutional
requirements and procedural and substantive restrictions on
adoption, whether domestic or international, would be the danger
that people aiming to exploit children sexually or by slave labor
might attempt to acquire victims through adoption, rather than, for
example, kidnapping.
Consistent with common usage in
international human rights documents and U.S. Department of
State publications, I use ‘trafficking’ to mean acquisition of
children for exploitation.160 I treated separately above the topic of
parents being induced by payments and/or fraud to relinquish
their children for adoption, which some authors, for rhetorical
purpose, confusingly conflate with trafficking.161

160 See, e.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 3(a), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) (“’Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons . . . for the
purpose of exploitation”); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT 2012 (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/.
161 See generally David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 281 (2004).
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Trafficking in the exploitative sense is a large and deeply
troubling practice.162 But this concern is a red herring in the
adoption context, ironic even. Traffickers are exceedingly unlikely
to use official adoption channels as the means for securing children
for sex trade or slave labor, so imposing legal restrictions on
official adoption will not diminish trafficking. In fact, there is no
evidence of a significant connection between trafficking and
international adoption. One might suppose that a westerner who
is a child sex predator could conclude that a promising strategy for
obtaining access to a child’s body is to go to a third world country
and pose as an adoption applicant. But there is no evidence of this
occurring, and it seems quite unlikely to succeed, given the natural
suspicion, or in many countries legal preclusion, of adoption
petitions filed by single men,163 and given the need to navigate the
immigration process for bringing a child into a western country.
Moreover, this supposed justification for making international
adoption more difficult or impossible is actually ironic because the
more a country creates obstacles to parents’ placing their children
with official adoption agencies the more likely desperate parents
are to give their children (perhaps unwittingly) to traffickers. A
father who concludes that he is unable to care for his child after the
mother has died and who finds that no family or community
member is available to foster the child would presumably prefer to
place the child for adoption into a good family. However, if his
country makes that impossible through approved agencies or
intermediaries, the child will be at great risk of starvation,
kidnapping, or being sold off to anyone who approaches the
parent with a stack of currency and empty promises.
The foregoing points can be made within the special rights
framework. What appeal to general rights adds is a requirement
that any asserted justification apply equally in the case of adults.
Trafficking is obviously a concern with adults as well, especially
women, and actually much more common with adolescent girls
and women than with little children. That very concern, coupled
with a suspicion that some women are lured into slavery by the
prospect of marrying a westerner, ostensibly led the Philippines to
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 160, at 45.
See Jennifer B. Mertus, Barriers, Hurdles, and Discrimination: The Current
Status of LGBT Intercountry Adoption and Why Changes Must Be Made to Effectuate
the Best Interests of the Child, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 271, 281–83 (2011) (stating that
many sending countries’ laws prohibit single parents from adopting).
162
163
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prohibit the operation of for-profit international marriage brokers
in that country.164 That action might suggest some support for the
notion of restricting emigration even of adults for paternalistic
reasons. However, the Philippines is alone in having such a
prohibition. Guatemala, which shut down international adoption
because of some reports of illicit payments and defrauding of
parents in connection with true adoptions (i.e., not trafficking), is a
major source of sex trafficking of women.165 Yet neither the
Guatemalan nor American government has proposed as a remedy
a prohibition on emigration of women from Guatemala; the
response to this much more harmful practice toward adolescents
and adults is instead to attempt to detect the illegal practice and
prosecute wrongdoers. The Philippine law, moreover, is little
enforced, is limited to restricting activities of certain businesses,
and in no way inhibits the emigration of Filipinas who find foreign
marriage partners by one of the innumerable other available
means.166
If the Philippine law did substantially diminish women’s
freedom to leave the country to pursue a better life, the human
rights community would likely condemn the law. It would do so
not just because there is consensus that women in desperate
poverty must be free, as autonomous adults, to accept the risk that
what looks like a real marriage prospect could turn out to be
enslavement, even if it is irrational to do so. It would be so in large
part because that risk of being trafficked is actually not high
enough to make the decision to pursue international marriage
irrational. In addition, under the ICCPR and the Siracusa
164 See Roxanne Sims, A Comparison of Laws in the Phillipines [sic], the U.S.A.,
Taiwan, and Belarus to Regulate the Mail-Order Bride Industry, 42 AKRON L. REV. 607,
616–17 (2009) (“The Philippines legislature intended for Republic Act No. 6955 to
protect Filipino women from being sexually and economically exploited by
international marriage brokers.”). The law might well have been a self-interested
reaction by male legislators to the exodus of women from the country to marry
Western men.
165 See generally Hannah Stone, Guatemala Creates Investigative Body to Fight
Human Trafficking, IN SIGHT CRIME (July 20, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/
news-briefs/guatemala-creates-investigative-body-to-fight-human-trafficking.
166 See Lilith, supra note 126, at 227 (“In spite of changes in Philippine law
intending to curb mail-order brides by banning organizations and advertisements
which promote marriages between Filipinas and foreign nationals, the number of
Filipina mail-order brides brought to U.S. increased steadily throughout the
1990s.”); id. at 255 (quoting a Filipina woman: “’There is nothing that can be done
to stop us from giving our names to pen pal companies’”); Sims, supra note 164, at
616–18 (describing limited effect of the Philippine law ).
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Principles, the state of origin would bear the burden of showing
that prohibiting emigration is the least restrictive means of
protecting women from exploitation. Prevailing rules and practice
suggest that concern about trafficking is generally viewed as
insufficient reason to deny any adults, even vulnerable ones, the
right to emigrate, which in turn creates a presumption under the
ICCPR that it is insufficient reason to deny children that right.
I will also note that, even if there were a substantial connection
between trafficking of children for sex or labor and official
adoption channels, the problem cannot logically justify particular
types of restrictions that many countries have adopted. In
particular, it does not justify any application of the DPP
Principle—not a policy of prohibiting international adoption but
allowing domestic adoption, not a policy of preferring domestic
adoption or foster care to international adoption, and not a policy
of holding children in orphanages for years to ensure domestic
adoption possibilities are exhausted before making them available
to foreigners. If there are sex predators who pose as adoption
applicants, they are more likely to be residents of the third world
country, and they are likely to prefer older children rather than
babies.167 Moreover, larger organizations in the business of
supplying children for sex tourism or factory labor, whether they
are in the sending country or not, could undoubtedly easily hire
locals to pose as adoption or foster care applicants, if they thought
that were a more propitious way of getting children than going
directly to impoverished parents.
5.3.3. Mistreatment of Children in Receiving Countries
Russian politicians have frequently cited as justification for
restricting foreign adoptions incidents of serious harm or death to
children adopted from Russia.
Proponents of international
adoption argue that it is irrational to condemn a practice involving
tens of thousands of children annually on the grounds that a very

167 Cf. Jim Loney, Haiti “Restavek” Tradition Called Child Slavery, REUTERS (Feb.
18, 2010 9:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/18/us-quake-haitirestaveks-idUSTRE61H3F920100218 (reporting that the prevalent form of “foster
care” in Haiti functions as child slavery).
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small number of cases have gone badly.168 Critics respond that
problems are more common than proponents think.169
What critics have not done, though, is an evidence-based
comparison of probabilities of maltreatment under the alternative
placements that were available for the children who were adopted.
To respond to reports of maltreatment, or simply to reports of
adjustment difficulties, by foreclosing international adoption is
nonsensical and irresponsible if that is still the available option
with the best odds of a good life for children. What critics would
need to show is that the very process of transferring a child from
an orphanage to an adoptive placement in another country itself is
more likely to damage the child than is some alternative, including
remaining in the orphanage until adulthood, transferring to an
adoptive or foster placement in the country of birth, being put out
on the streets, and so on. Absent such demonstration, the strong
presumption in favor of the right to emigrate under the ICCPR
controls.
And, in fact, available evidence shows that the complete
opposite is the reality, that the rates of maltreatment and harm are
far greater in poor countries’ non-parent-care systems than in
adoptive homes in other countries.170 Especially in light of those
comparative figures, the intuition of most people would
undoubtedly be that taking a chance on becoming part of a family
is a better choice than remaining in any institution or mercenary
foster home, that joining a family in another country soon after
168 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: A Way Forward, 55
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 687, 697 (2010/11).
169 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 14, at 474.
170 See, e.g., Christopher Balding, International Child Adoption Law and
Empirical Analysis (forthcoming) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law) (showing increased health and development risks
for orphaned children not adopted); Christopher Balding, Feng Yan, & Armita
Atashband, Who Wants to Adopt and Who Wants to Be Adopted: A Sample of American
Families and Sub-Saharan African Orphans, (forthcoming) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law) (contrasting the benefits
of adoptive families with increased levels of material deprivation in sub-Saharan
African orphans); Myra Imran, Condition of Child Rights Remained Bleak During
2012, THE NEWS (Pak.), May 29, 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/
PrintEdition.aspx?ID=180510&Cat=6&dt=9/7/2013 (describing dire situations
that Pakistani children face, including “lack of educational opportunities, poor
health conditions, a near absence of protection for poor and vulnerable children,
miserable conditions in juvenile jails and continued employment of children in
hazardous occupations[, as well as] physical violence, sexual abuse, trafficking,
recruitment in armed conflict and acid attacks”).
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birth is preferable to waiting a couple of years in institutional care
to see if any local family will step forward, and that joining a
family in the United States or Sweden is even preferable to
immediately joining a family in the country of one’s birth if the
latter family is living in deep poverty or in a place that has no
prospects for education and employment or is surrounded by
violence.
Placing international adoption within the broader framework
of transnational family formation suggests another comparison.
We should ask how the rate of abuse toward adopted children
compares to the rate of abuse by husbands against immigrant
wives. Further, we should ask why no one proposes as the remedy
for the perceived high rate of domestic violence toward immigrant
brides that the sending countries simply prohibit the emigration of
women for marriage or that the receiving countries deny them an
entry visa. Instead, the law’s response is simply to elicit more
information from the persons in receiving countries seeking to
form a family relationship with a vulnerable person from a poor
country through an intermediary—namely, requiring selfreporting and/or agency-conducted background checks, as is
already done with adoption.171 Within a framework of rights
shared by all persons, the potential for domestic abuse is placed in
a more objective light. And the ICCPR requirement of nondiscrimination presumptively precludes reliance on this concern as
justification for restricting children’s right to leave their country of
origin, if the same concern, with even stronger empirical
foundation, would not justify restricting adults’ right of
emigration.
5.3.4. Cultural Interests of Children
Another common objection to international adoption rests on
children’s supposed interest in remaining within the culture of
their state of origin or partaking in their “cultural heritage.”172
171 See Abrams, supra note 54, at 1653–64 (discussing International Marriage
Broker Regulation Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1375a (2012)).
172 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 72, at 242 (“Stripping a child of her identity
and familial, community, and cultural heritage is a severe deprivation of rights, as
the child generally has no choice in the matter and has her fundamental
orientation to herself and the world altered without her consent.”); King, supra
note 2, at 414, 466 (noting that in some countries intercountry adoptions are not
permitted); Roby & Shaw, supra note 145, at 202–05 (emphasizing “the importance
of racial and cultural identity for children in their adoption experience”).
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Many claim this is the primary concern underwriting the DPP
Principle.173 International adoption proponents point out the
suspect metaphysical nature of such a claim, at least as applied to
very young children, who are the most likely to be adopted. It
seems to suppose that even if a child born in, for example, Korea is
adopted and brought to the United States at the age of one, and
spends the rest of his life living in the United States, that “his
culture” is Korean culture.174 Such essentializing is normatively
problematic and empirically suspect. An infant has little or no
experience of culture, and to suppose that any child is per se
harmed by moving away from his or her place of birth would
damn every parent who has ever relocated from one country to
another, or even from one sub-national region or province to
another.
Elizabeth Bartholet refers to this cultural identity objection to
international adoption as “the false romanticism surrounding birth
and national heritage”175 and notes: “[s]cience provides no basis
for believing that children are better off if raised in their
community of origin.”176 In fact, studies involving interviews of
international adoptees, which presumably are the best evidence of
their experience, reveal that the vast majority feel little sense of loss
and little desire to learn more about or visit their country of
birth.177
It also appears that citizens of sending countries
173 See, e.g., Hearst, note 1, at 335–36 (arguing that children should have the
right to access their culture of origin); Smolin, supra note 146, at 422 (“Under
international law, adoption within the child’s birth country is clearly preferred
over intercountry adoption. The basis of this preference is apparently related to
the child’s identity rights.”) (footnote omitted).
174 See, e.g., Hearst, supra note 1, at 334.
175 Elizabeth Bartholet, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing
Parents Found in International Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 785 (2011).
176 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 97 (citation omitted).
177 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 80, 111-21 (finding, based on interviews
with adoptees returning to Norway from “motherland tours,” that most come
back “fully confirmed in their Norwegianness”). Transracial adoptions raise a
somewhat different concern about “fitting in” one’s adoptive family. That has
been an issue in debates over adoption domestically within the United States. The
concern arises in the United States mostly for black children raised by white
adoptive parents. See Bergquist, supra note 126, at 348. This occurs only for a
small percentage of international adoptive children. And though it is a genuine
issue, a potential source of difficulty for adopted children, studies show that it is
not so substantial a difficulty as to justify significant impediments to transracial
adoptions.
See id. (“Early adoption research documented the successful
adaptation of minority children into their white middle class families, and more
recent studies have indicated that these children do well in school, attach to their
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themselves do not think people born there lose anything significant
by separating from the country at an early age and being raised in
a different culture; many express puzzlement with westerners’
preoccupation with “roots.”178
Increasingly, international adopters have been encouraged to
facilitate their children’s learning about their nation of origin and
forming a positive impression of it, and that has become common
practice.179 Some do not, and those who do cannot give a child an
insider’s experience of the native country’s culture.180 But even so,
there is little empirical support for the supposition that
internationally adopted children commonly feel a great sense of
loss if they do not have a strong connection to their native culture.
Nor is there any factual basis for supposing that, for any children
who do experience such a sense of loss, this is such a detriment to
their wellbeing as to outweigh the improvements to their lives
arising from the adoption.181 It certainly would not mean that their
lives are devoid of any culture. Sara Dillon aptly states:
In order to be consistent with the international rights of
children, legal regimes must reflect a hierarchy of human
needs, with consistency and depth of care placed at the top
adoptive families, and have relatively few psychosocial or behavioral problems in
comparison to their white peers.”) (footnotes omitted); Tanya M. Washington,
Throwing Black Babies Out With the Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to SameSex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 1, 47–49 (2008–2009)
(discussing Congressional finding that not being adopted is more harmful than
any difficulty transracial placement might entail).
178 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 209 (Ethiopia); id. at 215 (China); id. at
220 (Romania).
179 See HOWELL, supra note 2, at 238 (showing that adoptive parents often take
children on “roots” or “motherland tours”); HOWELL, supra note 18, at 32, 76–79
(describing pamphlets, associations among families, organized trips back to
country of origin, etc.); Stark, supra note 131, at 1270–71 (discussing the tendency
of white parents to make Chinese culture a part of their adopted Chinese
children’s lives). But see HOWELL, supra note 18, at 74 (providing evidence that
many Norwegian adoptive parents attempt to distance the child from the native
culture, at least initially, in an effort to ensure the child’s full assimilation to a new
home).
180 See Hearst, supra note 1, at 339 (explaining that it is difficult for adopted
children to be exposed to their origin country in any meaningful way).
181 Cf. HOWELL, supra note 18, at 78–79 (noting the view of some observers
that efforts to give children a community and cultural experience tied to their
adoption from another country might serve interests of adoptive parents more
than interests of the children); id. at 106 (describing adoptees who categorically
reject the notion that they are incomplete unless they connect with the culture of
their country of birth).
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of the hierarchy. National legal regimes should not be
constructed on the belief that complex relationships with
cultural environments are the equivalent of the
psychological problems that arise from long-term residence
in institutional or other inadequate care.182
Elizabeth Bartholet draws a similar analogy to adult emigration
of the sort I have made throughout this Article, to put in proper
perspective the concern about culture. She points out that “it
would be laughable to argue that adults should be prevented from
leaving their country of birth so they could enjoy their heritage
rights.”183 Invoking the more general human right to emigrate
under the UDHR and the ICCPR gives that analogy legal purchase,
insofar as those legal documents create a strong presumption that
all persons possess the same rights, and so that any justification
that would be inadequate in the case of adults must also be so in
the case of children.
Further, thinking about cultural ties within this broader context
gives us a clearer and more objective sense of its relative
importance as an empirical matter, for then we can look to the
decisions autonomous adults make as evidence of how they
prioritize their various interests. Adults who have spent their
entire lives thus far in their native land naturally are more wedded
to the culture of that land than is an infant and have more of their
identity bound up with it. Yet a large portion of them have
decided that they nevertheless want to emigrate to a more
advanced nation because the opportunities for a better life,
including a better family life, are so much greater there that they
outweigh any interest in remaining immersed in their native
culture, language, and family life. In addition, pregnant foreign
women by the thousands travel to the United States each year in
the hope of giving birth here and thereby securing U.S. citizenship
for their children, so that the children can upon reaching
adulthood (or sooner) leave their native land and families and
come to live in the United States.184 These phenomena ought to tell
182 Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human
Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 179, 238
(2003) (footnote omitted).
183 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 97.
184 See Cindy Chang, In Suburbs of L.A., a Cottage Industry of Birth Tourism,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013/jan/03/local/la-
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us something about the relative importance of cultural heritage to
human welfare. The cost-benefit analysis presumably tips even
more so in favor of migration for infants, both because they have
less to give up culturally and because they can more easily adapt to
a new culture, language, and living situation.
Moreover, there would also be no purchase to moral
exhortation directed at adults aiming to emigrate via marriage that
they should prefer a domestic marriage, and so should not move to
another country and form a family with someone there so long as
there is any “suitable” spouse available to them in their home
country. Many women in former Soviet Union countries who seek
husbands in Western countries explain their choice largely in terms
of having a low opinion of Russian men and perceiving little
prospect for the kind of marriage they want in their native
country.185 This view might be even more compelling if held by
women in any Islamic countries where norms relating to family life
are more intensely patriarchal. We would never suggest to these
women that they ought, in order to avoid losing touch with their
native culture or in order to fulfill some obligation to their native
country, to settle for a merely suitable spouse at home rather than
aiming higher by seeking a spouse abroad.
This leads to a further problem with the objection based on
cultural heritage. If we were to survey adults seeking to leave the
countries that are traditional or potential sending countries for
adoption, and ask them what they think of life and culture in their
home country, undoubtedly a great many of them, especially
women, would portray their native culture negatively.186 We
might reasonably assume there is some good in every national
culture, but consider just the idea of America returning to its
culture of two centuries ago and how unappealing that would be
to the women of America today. Opponents of international

me-birthing-centers-20130104 (describing L.A.’s growing number of “maternity
hotels,” where foreign women stay for the sole purpose of giving birth in the
United States).
185 See Christine S.Y. Chun, Comment, The Mail-Order Bride Industry: The
Perpetuation of Transnational Economic Inequalities and Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. INT’L
ECON. L. 1155, 1175 (1996) (reporting view of many Russian women that American
men will make better husbands than Russian men).
186 Cf. Stark, supra note 131, at 1272–73 (noting that Americans who adopt
Chinese girls and who endeavor to give their daughters a connection to Chinese
culture tend to omit “the misogyny of traditional Chinese culture” and
“Confucian ideas about family hierarchy and patriarchy”).
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adoption who invoke children’s supposed cultural interests are
astonishingly silent about the possibility that a particular country’s
culture might actually have deeply troubling aspects to it. It is as
if, for some critics of international adoption, the only country in the
world whose culture is subject to criticism is the United States.
That of every other country is unassailable, and only an arrogant
imperialist would suggest that some cultures are best left behind.
Meanwhile, in another part of the academy and in another realm of
international human rights advocacy, Westerners are freely
condemning many of these same countries for systematically
violating their citizens’ human rights in ways that make life
generally intolerable for many people—for example, by promoting
subordination of women, by condoning violence toward women
and sexual minorities, by mutilating girls’ genitals, by forcing tenyear old girls to marry old men and forcing ten year-old boys to
fight in wars, by killing adherents to minority religions, by jailing
political dissenters, and so on.187 All that critics of international
adoption see in the cultures of poor countries, it seems, is folk tales,
ceremonial dances, and colorful costumes. Sui generis thinking
about children facilitates such myopic and surrealist romanticizing
of life in the third world.
5.3.5. Kinship Ties
Some critics of international adoption maintain that
international adoption entails a great loss for children insofar as it
separates them from their biological kin and that sending countries
should pursue the possibility of kin care for every child in an
orphanage before approving an adoption by a foreigner. They
would give kin placement categorical preference over international
adoption with non-kin.188
It is plausible to suppose that, all else being equal, children are
better off being raised by extended family members when parents
are unable to care for them. This position that international
adoption should be put off for a child while agencies search for kin
to take the child is problematic, however, for several reasons. One
187 See, e.g., Blaine Bookey, Enforcing the Right to be Free from Sexual Violence
and the Role of Lawyers in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 14 CUNY L. REV. 255, 259–63 (2011)
(stating that sexual violence is common in Haiti); Todres, supra note 148, at 60–61
(offering evidence that children in Haiti experience a variety of human rights
violations).
188 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 72, at 240–241; King, supra note 2, at 466.
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downside is delay. Children need attachment figures in place as
early as possible for their healthy development, so the longer they
live in an institutional setting, the more they suffer
developmentally.189 A foreign adoption also takes substantial time,
but there is nearly complete certainty that at the end of the process
permanency will have been achieved, whereas a domestic search is
quite likely to end in failure.
Elizabeth Bartholet has proposed as a solution to the delay
problem associated with seeking kin or other domestic placements
that countries engage in a form of “concurrent planning,” and she
co-authored federal legislation that commits the United States to
promoting this practice.190 Sending countries would search for a
good domestic placement but at the same time complete as many
steps as possible toward a foreign adoption, so that if a good
domestic placement does not arise, the foreign adoption can go
forward immediately. This approach might sound more costly for
sending countries, but it is not necessarily so. If we assume that
searches for domestic adopters or kin guardians usually fail, then
the alternative to conducting both processes for each child
concurrently is usually to do them both anyway but sequentially.
Bartholet’s concurrent planning proposal might actually lower
countries’ costs on the whole, because the sequential approach
causes children to remain longer in state care before being
available for foreign adoption, and that means both that the state
must support most children for a longer period of time, and that
some children who could have been adopted ultimately are not
because they become too old while held in institutional limbo.
An additional problem with emphasis on kin placement is that
nonparent kin can be as exploitative as child-labor traffickers,
taking in a child not out of loving concern for the child’s wellbeing
but rather out of mercenary motivation (e.g., if they will receive
payments to do so) and/or desire for free labor. The so-called

See Dwyer, supra note 8, at 415–35.
Children in Families First Act of 2013, S. 1530, 113th Cong. (2013);
Bartholet, supra note 35, at 193–94. In the domestic child protection context,
“concurrent planning” has a different meaning, referring to simultaneously
attempting rehabilitation of parents and preparing for a termination of parental
rights and adoption should the rehabilitation efforts fail.
189
190
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“foster-care system” in Haiti, for example, is known for turning
orphans into relatives’ indentured servants.191
Further, connection to kin is, as a factual matter, even when a
positive thing, only one variable in a child’s overall wellbeing, and
in many cases its possibility is outweighed by the quality of care
particular kin are capable of providing (e.g., if they are living in
abject poverty) and problems in the community or nation where
the kin live (e.g., famine, war, disease, oppression). In fact, some
studies of international adoptees suggest ties to biological family
are much less important to them than DPP Principle supporters
They show that international adoptees who as
assert.192
adolescents return to their country of birth, typically at the urging
of their adoptive parents, do not manifest great interest in tracking
down birth parents or biological relatives.193 Moreover, even
assuming this is an important experience or desire for them, there
is no evidence that any conclude they would have been better off
remaining in their country of birth and being raised among their
biological kin. Adoptees become integrated into a kin network
with their adoptive family, and that network of relationships is
constitutive of their identity.194 At most, international adoptees
might want at some point to know about their biological relatives
and to make contact with them, and if they fail in their search they
do not conclude that they were harmed by being adopted.
In any event, I have assumed in this article that the children in
question are generally ones whose parents are deceased or have
lost or relinquished custody and whose biological kin are not
available to care for them—in other words, children whose only
alternatives to international adoption even in theory are just
domestic adoption or foster care by strangers and institutional
placement. As to these children, whereas any of these alternatives
might allow a child to grow up in a native culture, none inherently
involve maintaining ties to extended biological family. Many
cultures within developing countries have a tradition of communal
care for children and child rearing by kin or biologically unrelated
191 See Carlson, supra note 15, at 762 (“In Haiti, what might pass for foster care
is actually a form of indentured servitude.”); Loney, supra note 167 (describing
Haitian tradition of “restavek” as child slavery).
192 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 111–21 (offering evidence that many adopted
children are not concerned by biological ties to family).
193 Id. at 114.
194 See, e.g., Howell, supra note 2, at 232–33; HOWELL, supra note 18 at 74.
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community members, but poverty, disease, war, and other
tragedies have made it impossible for many communities to
sustain this tradition.195 This insistence that a government agency
pursue kin seems to presuppose that no one else has done so
before the child ends up in an orphanage. Yet it seems more
plausible to assume that any parents who bring their child to an
orphanage have first exhausted other possibilities and that when
parents have died, relatives were aware of this but concluded that
they were unable to assume custody of the child.
5.3.6 Summary
None of the objections commonly leveled at international
adoption suffice to deny the children of any country the right to
leave for purposes of family formation. Concern about parents
being defrauded might be pertinent under the ICCPR, but a
country would have to document it and address it by the least
restrictive means. Any other concerns that do not relate to the
welfare of children awaiting adoption are impertinent. As to child
welfare concerns, the only experiences that are clearly bad are
trafficking or maltreatment by adoptive parents. As to those,
sending countries bear the burden under the ICCPR of
demonstrating that the problem is sufficiently pervasive to warrant
some policy response and the burden of limiting that response to
measures that constitute the least restrictive means of addressing
those problems. Significantly, these child welfare concerns do not
justify a rule prioritizing domestic placement of unparented
children; such a rule will not inhibit trafficking in the exploitative
sense and children currently in orphanages or living on streets are
much more likely to incur harm if they remain in their native
country. To give effect to children’s right of emigration, as with
any other right they possess, entails a proxy decision on their
behalf as to how to best serve their interests taking all relevant
factors into consideration. Critics of international adoption have
not demonstrated that international adoption is with any
frequency an irrational proxy decision for children.

195 See, e.g., Roby & Shaw, supra note 145, at 200; Celia W. Dugger, Aid Gives
Alternative to African Orphanages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/06/world/africa/06orphans.html (reporting that “children placed
in institutions are often seen as the lucky ones” because families are often too poor
to provide education or adequate food.).
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With respect to several concerns, I have noted that they might
be more significant in the case of older children. Compared to
newborns and infants, older children are more likely to have
psychological problems at the outset that could trigger
maltreatment by adoptive parents and that could otherwise make
the transition to a new situation difficult. They are also more likely
to have a worldview and personal identity tied to their native
country’s culture and more likely to suffer in the short term from
changing linguistic environment. Further, they are more likely to
know their biological extended family and to have established
relationships with siblings. These differences could in theory
support different policies for older children relative to the
youngest, perhaps entailing more effort to secure a domestic
placement for older children.196 Yet some common current state
policies actually embody an opposite policy stance, such as those
permitting only domestic adoptions for children until they reach a
certain age. Were UNICEF and the Children’s Rights Committee
truly concerned only about the wellbeing of children, they might
pressure sending nations to favor expedited international adoption
of babies and to favor domestic placement of some kind—when one
is available—just with older children. Unfortunately for older
children, the prospects for a domestic placement are also much
worse than they are for infants, so limiting their options by
imposing a stronger domestic placement preference, one that
delays or forestalls adoption, is likely to be on balance harmful to
them as well. For no child should such a preference result in
remaining in institutional or foster care for a substantial period
when a good adoptive placement is available.
6. CONCLUSION
It is time to start a new conversation about international
adoption, putting aside the special children focused conventions
and beginning instead with general human rights that children
share with adults—most promisingly, the “right to leave any
country.” This would establish a presumption that children should
receive treatment comparable to that given adults in similar
circumstances. And it would place squarely on countries where
196 Cf. Smolin, supra note 146, at 424 (“[I]n some instances, high quality foster
care or institutional care might be superior to the extreme language, cultural, and
educational transitions that intercountry adoption would require of school age
children.”) (footnote omitted).
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unparented children live the burden of justifying any obstacles
they have created to children’s emigration for purposes of family
formation.
The cautionary lesson here about group-specific rights extends
more broadly. Advocates for children and other vulnerable groups
should guard against getting lost in the thicket of specialized
conventions, constitutional amendments, or statutes. In fact, they
should resist the lure of enacting special-rights laws in the first
place; such enactments might initially represent a gain in some
ways relative to the status quo, but they might represent a loss in
other ways and might freeze the group in a subordinate position as
the rights of others advance. Advocates should return repeatedly
to universal rights instruments to mine them for support and
potentially more effective procedures to redress human rights
violations.
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